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THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" 







The Massachusetts Zoning Actl provides that "any person ag­
grieved"2 by a decision of a permit or special permit granting au­
thority3 may appeal the decision by bringing an action in the 
appropriate court. Complaints take the form of an administrative 
appeal,4 the appeal of a special permit decision,5 the appeal of a 
variance decision,6 or some combination thereof. Plaintiffs are lim­
ited to "any municipal officer or board"7 and to persons whose 
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. B.A., 1973, Ithaca College; 
M.A., 1975, University of Oregon; J.D., 1985, New England School of Law. 
1. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 17 (1994), which provides in pertinent part: 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals or any special 
permit granting authority ... whether or not previously a party to the proceed­
ing, or any municipal officer or board may appeal to the ... court ... by 
bringing an action within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the 
office of the city or town clerk. 
Id. The Subdivision Control Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 41, § 8lBB (1994), also requires a 
showing of aggrieved status to obtain judicial review. See id. The principles which 
guide standing under the Zoning Act are readily transferable to the realm of subdivi­
sion control. See Carey v. Planning Bd., 335 Mass. 740, 743-44, 139 N.E.2d 920, 923 
(1957); Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956,642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994); Wind­
sor v. Planning Bd., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 650,655,531 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1988). 
2. For a discussion of other statutes employing the "aggrieved person" standard, 
see Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 164,638 N.E.2d 923 (1994). 
3. For the definitions of "permit granting authority" and "special permit granting 
authority," see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, § 1A (1994). 
4. See §§ 7, 8, 15, 17. Section 8 also establishes that a "person aggrieved" may 
commence an administrative appeal (of an adverse decision by the building inspector or 
the zoning administrator) by appropriate action before the board of appeals. Id. The 
term "person aggrieved" has the same meaning in this context. Green v. Board of Ap­
peals, 404 Mass. 571, 573, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1989). 
5. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, §§ 9,17 (1994). 
6. See §§ 10, 17. 
7. Id. The standing of municipal boards or officers is generally not disputed, and 
is outside the scope of this Article. For cases in which board standing has been contro­
versial, see Dowling v. Board of Health, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 548, 552 N .E.2d 866, 867 
(1990) (holding that board of health does not have standing in a zoning dispute); 
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property interests will be affected. These persons are said to have 
"standing" to bring the action. 
Prior to 1992, there had developed a "small but reasonably co­
herent body of case law ... explicating the standards for determin­
ing aggrievement under [Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40A, 
section 17]."8 Generally, standing turns on the issue of "injury." 
An aggrieved person is, first and foremost, "one whose legal rights 
have been infringed."9 In essence, there must be a showing of some 
special injury by the party claiming standing to set him or her apart 
from the general public.1O For obvious reasons, frustrated permit 
applicants have little difficulty demonstrating the requisite injury; if 
a zoning permit has been denied or stringent conditions imposed, 
"legal rights" have assuredly been called into question. But what of 
other parties, particularly neighbors hostile to a development pro­
posal targeting nearby land? The case law prior to 1992 suggested, 
in two dozen reported challenges, that abutters and close neighbors 
were entitled to standing.!l In fact, the court developed "presump­
tions" to benefit close neighbors. More remote parties were re­
quired to demonstrate a stake in the outcome to qualify as 
plaintiffs, without the benefit of any presumption. 
In 1992, this "reasonably coherent" system for allocating stand­
ing came to a halt. The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Barvenik 
v. Board of Aldermen,12 reviewed the test for standing as it had 
been applied to situations involving close neighbors appealing a 
zoning decision. The court set out two controversiall3 expectations. 
First, the court demanded rigorous proof of the "special and differ­
ent"l4 injury necessary for standing. In this regard, Barvenik's evi-
Harvard Square Defense Fund v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491,496,540 N.E.2d 
182, 186 (holding that SIngle member of larger board cannot claim standing to challenge 
a permit decision), review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542 N.E.2d 602 (1989). 
8. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 130,597 N.E.2d 48, 50 
(1992). 
9. Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d 
920,922-23 (1949). See the discussion in the text accompanying infra notes 117-18. 
10. In general, "[i]t [is] not enough ... [to] have ... a general civic interest in the 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance." Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. 
App. Ct. 210, 218, 326 N.E.2d 348, 353 (1975). See also Green v. Board of Appeals, 404 
Mass. 571, 574, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1989). 
11. See discussion infra part III. 
12. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 597 N.E.2d 48. 
13. See, e.g., Michael Halley, Appeals Court Addresses 'Aggrieved Person' Status, 
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 28, 1995, at B3 ("The Appeals Court ... has evinced an 
unprincipled bias against standing .... [The court has] ignored precedent, abandoned 
prudence and abdicated restraint in denying plaintiffs' standing to sue."). 
14. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132,597 N.E.2d at 51. 
387 1996] THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD 
dentiary demands, particularly those requiring a showing that the 
plaintiff has suffered an "injury in fact," closely tracked the ruling 
of the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild­
life (Lujan II),15 decided only six weeks earlier.16 When standing is 
contested, particularly in the context of a motion for summary judg­
ment or during the course of trial, Barvenik (and Lujan II) insist 
upon more than mere "speculative personal opinion" or 
"[s]ubjective and unspecific fears"17 to show injury. Barvenik re­
quires that a plaintiff provide: 
specific evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the 
[decision] will result, if not in a diminution in the value of his 
property, at least in his property or legal rights being more ad­
versely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a) 
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a 
result of the uses and activities permitted as of right on the ... 
locus.1s 
In a series of cases following Barvenik,19 the appeals court has care­
fully explained the scope of this evidentiary burden. 
In equating injury with diminution in value, the appeals court 
made its second expectation clear. Standing, for close neighbors, is 
limited to those with "legitimate" zoning-related concems20_traf­
fic increases, parking problems, or the potential for litter-that may 
cause diminution in value or economic harm. Aesthetic considera­
tions, including neighborhood appearance, incompatible architec­
tural styles, and the diminution of neighborhood ambiance, "are all 
considered insufficient bases for aggrievement. "21 
The result was an unintended revolution in practice and proce­
dure in land use law. Simply put, Barvenik and its progeny re­
moved the predictability from standing. Decisions reported prior to 
15. 504 u.s. 555 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan II]. For a discussion of the "injury in 
fact" reqUirement, see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. 
16. Lujan II was decided on June 12, 1992. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 555. Barvenik 
was decided on August 3,1992. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. O. at 129, 597 N.E.2d at 48. In 
a telephone interview on December 6, 1995, Justice Laurence, the author of Barvenik, 
indicated that Lujan II had played a considerable role in his decision. Telephone Inter­
view with Justice Laurence, Massachusetts Appeals Court (Dec. 6, 1995). Indeed, the 
case is extensively quoted in Barvenik, and in later decisions in the Barvenik line. 
17. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132,597 N.E.2d at 51. See also Lujan II, 504 
U.S. at 560-61. . 
18. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 133,597 N.E.2d at 51. 
19. See discussion infra part IV. 
20. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 133,597 N.E.2d at 51. 
21. Id. 
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1992 indicated an overwhelming likelihood that close neighbors 
challenging a permit decision would be granted access to the 
court.22 A survey of trial court decisions from 1993 to 1995 indi­
cates that this was no longer true: in the post-Barvenik trial courts, 
close neighbors were routinely dismissed from zoning disputes.23 
As a result, a challenge to standing became de rigueur. Barvenik 
did nothing if not encourage a full-scale war at an early stage in the 
litigation over the standing of neighbors with obvious costly 
consequences. 
In Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals,24 decided in 1996, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts belatedly attempted 
to rein in the runaway Barvenik ruling. The court's divided opin­
ion25 held that a finding by a trial judge as to standing should not be 
overturned unless clearly erroneous.26 Barvenik's lack of deference 
to this standard was thereby corrected. The court also quarreled 
with Barvenik's statement of the threshold for injury in fact, and 
reduced that test to a mere factor for consideration.27 Other impor­
tant aspects of Barvenik were left intact. 
This Article will trace the changes worked by the Barvenik line 
of cases as the rulings percolated through the system from the trial 
courts to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Part I will ex­
plore basic concepts of the doctrine of standing. The decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts will be reviewed in order to place Barvenik and 
Marashlian in proper perspective. Part II will examine the proce­
dural issues surrounding the doctrine, detailing the evidentiary ex­
pectations of the court as the issue is raised at various times in 
proceedings. Part III will look at the doctrine of standing as it was 
applied in pre-Barvenik zoning decisions. Part IV will take a close 
look at the Barvenik line of cases, all emanating from the Massa­
chusetts Appeals Court. Trial court decisions following Barvenik 
will also be inventoried in this section. Part V will review 
Barvenik's reception at the Supreme Judicial Court, with a thor­
ough discussion and critique of the Marashlian decision. Finally, 
22. See discussion infra part III. 
23. See discussion infra part IV.B. 
24. 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996). 
25. Marashlian was a four to three decision. Justices Liacos, Wilkins, Abrams, 
and Fried formed the majority, with Justices O'Connor, Greaney, and Lynch in dissent. 
Id. 
26. Id. at 725, 660 N.E.2d at 374. 
27. - Id. at 724, 660 N.E.2d at 373. 
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the conclusion will offer some practical guidance to navigate the 
post-Marashlian era. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF STANDING 
The doctrine of standing has evolved in both the federal and 
state courts. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
honed its test for standing to attack administrative action, particu­
larly as that standard is applied to parties who are not the objects of 
the administrative decision-making. The approach of the United 
States Supreme Court has been, in part, borrowed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which has its own interpretation of 
the doctrine. In order to appreciate the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court's position in Barvenik, which owes no small debt to prece­
dent, it must be viewed in these parallel contexts. These contexts 
also enable a more reasoned critique of the Marashlian decision. 
A. The Federal Context 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power 
of the federal courts to the resolution of "cases" and "controver­
sies."28 Several administrative law doctrines-including ripeness,29 
mootness,30 political question,31· and standing-trace their purpose 
to Article III. These doctrines relate "in part, and in different 
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intui­
tion but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitu­
28. u.s. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
29. "Ripeness ... is concerned primarily with the institutional relationships be­
tween courts and agencies, and the competence of the courts to resolve disputes without 
further administrative refinement of the issues." Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade 
Comm'n, 814 F.2d 731,735 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Ripeness looks to "the fitness of the issues 
for judicial determination and the hardship of the parties that would result from grant­
ing or denying review. . . . [I]n essence, it asks whether he may be attempting to short 
circuit the administrative process or whether he has been reasonably diligent in protect­
ing his own interests." Id. The leading Supreme Court decision on the issue of ripeness 
is undoubtedly Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
30. "A justiciable controversy is ... distinguished from a difference or dispute of 
a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. The contro­
versy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having ad­
verse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific 
relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion ad­
vising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,240-41 (1937) (citations omitted). 
31. The political question doctrine suggests that certain matters are inherently 
political in nature and ought not to be the subject of judicial review. The doctrine 
applies in a variety of circumstances, nicely summarized in the leading case of Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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tional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government."32 The case 
or controversy doctrine, and its corollary rules, help to ensure the 
separation of powers upon which the federal government is 
founded.33 
The Supreme Court has called standing the "most important of 
these doctrines."34 It is not a "mere pleading requirement[] but 
rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case. "35 
"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is en­
titled to have the' court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues." Standing doctrine embraces several judicially 
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as 
the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's 
legal rights, the rule barring adjudieation of generalized griev­
ances more appropriately addressed in the representative 
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.36 
Standing has been routinely used within the federal system to ac­
complish these and other objectives.3? The doctrine of standing im­
poses a threshold jurisdictional requirement for would-be plaintiffs; 
in order to gain access to the court in an administrative dispute, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy.38 
32. Vander Jagt v.O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)'(Bork, J., con­
curring), quoted in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982). 
34. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
35. Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
36. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975». 
37. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4. at 
129 (2d ed. 1992). This administrative law hornbook suggests that standing serves sev­
eral objectives unrelated to the constitutional rationale. [d. Standing, it is alleged, is 
sometimes used by the Supreme Court 
(1) 	to avoid deciding issues it does not want to decide; 
(2) to allow it to decide issues it does not want to decide; 
(3) 	to avoid deciding issues that it believes should be decided by other 
branches of government; . 
(4) to avoid deciding issues that should be decided by state governments; 
(5) to reflect implicitly the subjective values the Court assigns to various con­
stitutional and statutory rights; 
(6) to limit the ability of judges to become involved in policy disputes that are 
governed only by vague constitutional standards; and 
(7) 	 to avoid judicial involvement in cases where the plaintiff's claim has little 
merit. 
[d. 
38. Access to the federal courts is generally obtained, as to administrative mat­
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A key aspect of the "case or controversy" requirement is a 
showing of injury in fact. Economic harm, of course, has long been 
acknowledged as sufficient injury in fact. Agency action which di­
rectly interferes with a property right or causes diminution in value 
would present the type of injury required for standing.39 But the 
United States Supreme Court has not limited standing to those suf­
fering economic injury. The Court has also ruled, most notably in 
Sierra Club v. Morton,40 that "[a]esthetic and environmental well­
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the 
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environ­
mental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does 
not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judi­
cial process."41 Thus, standing may be awarded where the requisite 
injury in fact is "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational. "42 
Undoubtedly, the high water mark of standing came in United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures .43 
The decision, commonly known as SCRAP, has come to serve as 
the most notorious example of the expansive federal concept of in­
jury in fact. A group of law students successfully claimed standing 
by alleging that a general rail rate hike would result in the increased 
use of nonrecyclable goods as compared to recyclable goods, caus­
ing more refuse to be discarded in the national parks of the Wash­
ington, D.C. area, and diminishing their enjoyment of these public 
parks.44 The students were ruled to have suffered the requisite aes­
thetic and conservational harm for standing to challenge the rate 
increase.45 
ters, through § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act,S U.S.C. § 702 (1994), 
which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti­
tled to judicial review thereof." Id. 
39. See Federal Communication Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 
U.S. 470,476-77 (1940). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970); Associ­
ation of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. ISO, 152 (1970). 
40. 405 U.S. 727(1972). 
41. Id. at 734. 
42. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 
608,616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), quoted in Camp, 397 U.S. at 
154. 
43. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
44. See id. at 688-89. 
45. Id. at 689-90. The Supreme Court has suggested that SCRAP is limited to its 
procedural context, which involved the review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. 
R. Cry. P. 12(b)(I). See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 n.25 
(1976). In Simon, the Court hinted that while the complaint in question "withstood a 
motion to dismiss, ... it might not have survived challenge on a motion for summary 
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Since SCRAP, the Supreme Court has systematically imposed 
a more stringent view of standing without modifying the Sierra 
Club formulation of injury in fact.46 Instead, the Court has de­
manded a nexus between the claimed injury and the government 
action being challenged.47 A plaintiff claiming standing in the fed­
eral courts must show 
the irreducible constitutional minimum of ... three elements. 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an in­
vasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 
'hypothetical[.]'" Second, there must be a causal connection be­
tween the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has 
to be "fairly tracer able] to the challenged action of the defend­
ant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as 
opposed to merely ."speculative," that the injury will be "re­
dressed by a favorable decision."48 
In addition, the Supreme Court has sometimes imposed a fourth 
element to assess standing. In Association of Data Processing Ser­
vice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,49 the Court ruled that plaintiffs 
must assert an interest that is arguably "within the zone of interests 
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaran­
tee in question."5o The "zone of interests" test has been interpreted 
to require some showing that "the interest asserted by a party in the 
particular instance is one intended by Congress to be protected or 
regulated by the statute under which suit is brought."51 The test has 
gone unmentioned in many Supreme Court decisions on standing.52 
However, in several recent decisions, the Court has revived the 
judgment." Id. See also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) 
[hereinafter Lujan I]; Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
46. The Court has repeatedly cited the Sierra Club standard with approval. See 
Lujan I, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) ("Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal 
species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for [the] 
purpose of standing."). See also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,16 (1992) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
47. The Court imposed its nexus requirement as early as 1975 in Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
48. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (third, fourth, fifth and sixth alterations in origi­
nal) (footnote and citations omitted). 
49. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
50. Id. at 153. 
51. Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 881 (1981). 
52. The "zone of interests" test was virtually dormant in the period immediately 
following Data Processing, inspiring influential Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to sug­
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issue.53 
The nexus and redressibility requirements imposed by post­
SCRAP decisions, along with the revival of the zone of interests 
test, has significantly tightened access to the federal courts, particu­
larly when the plaintiff is not the object of the governmental action 
at issue. In Lujan II, the Court noted that "[w]hen ... a plaintiff's 
asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful reg­
ulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else ... standing is not 
precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to estab­
lish."54 This is due, in the federal context, precisely to the nexus 
and redressibility standards.55 The threshold for injury in fact re­
mains quite low; the Court has fashioned the new tests to ensure 
that plaintiffs will raise more than the "adjudication of generalized 
grievances"56 prohibited by Article III. 
B. The Massachusetts Context 
In Massachusetts, the doctrine of standing originates in practi­
cal, rather than constitutional, considerations. The Massachusetts 
Constitution has no counterpart to Article Ill's Case or Contro­
versy Clause.57 Thus, standing has evolved as a prudential limita­
tion, created by the court, to serve a variety of objectives in the 
review of administrative decisions. 
[W]hether a party is properly before a tribunal to invoke its judi­
cial powers affects the good order and efficiency with which the 
gest that the Court had abandoned the concept. KENNETH C. DAVIS, AOMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-11, at 509 (1976). 
53. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 
U.S. 517 (1991); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). 
54. Lujan /I, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 
(1984». 
55. See id. 
56. Id. at 575. 
57. However, Part I, Article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution clearly spells 
out the need for separation of powers, and the doctrine of standing does peripherally 
promote this goal. Article XXX states: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The exec­
utive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either 
of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX. 
Under the auspices of Article XXX, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
has refused to decide moot questions or abstract propositions. See, e.g., Caputo v. 
Board of Appeals, 330 Mass. 107, 111, 111 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1953) (citation omitted). 
See also Razin v. Razin, 332 Mass. 754, 124 N.E.2d 269 (1955). 
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matter proceeds .... The multiplicity of parties and the increased 
participation by persons whose rights are at best obscure will, in 
the absence of exact adherence to requirements as to standing, 
seriously erode the efficacy of the administrative process. We do 
not say that increased citizen participation is bad. On the con­
trary, such interesterisures full review of all issues. However, to 
preserve orderly administrative processes and judicial review 
thereof, a party must meet the legal requirements necessary to 
confer standing. 58 . 
In this regard, the doctrine of standing shares the stage with the. 
doctrines of mootness,59 ripeness,60 and exhaustion of administra­
tive remedies,61 which are all designed to promote the efficient ad­
ministration of justice. 
Standing is, however, more than a procedural technicality. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has emphasized that the 
question of whether a party has standing to participate in ajudicial 
review "involves remedial rights affecting the whole of the proceed­
ing."62 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts asserted, in Barvenik 
v. Board of Aldermen, that standing is "a vital element of all pro­
ceedings challenging administrative action."63 
In keeping with the federal framework for standing, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has insisted upon some injury to set plain­
tiffs apart from the general public. In order to gain access to the 
court,64 the plaintiff must show harm to a legal right or protected 
interest.65 The Supreme Judicial Court has never embraced the 
loose federal test for injury in fact. The legal right or interest cited 
by the plaintiff must involve harm to economic or pecuniary 
58. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 366 Mass. 667, 672, 322 N.E.2d 
742, 748 (1975). 
59. See, e.g., Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare. 367 Mass. 293. 298. 327 
N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975). 
60. See, e.g., Federman v. Board of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 729, 626 
N.E.2d 8, 10 (1994). 
61. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 361 Mass. 582, 587, 281 
N.E.2d 573, 577 (1972). 
62. Save the Bay, 366 Mass. at 672, 322 N.E.2d at 748 (1975). 
63. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 n.lO, 597 N.E.2d 
48,52 n.10 (1992). 
64. Access to the court for the review of administrative decisions by agencies of 
the Commonwealth is generally available pursuant to MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A, § 14 
(1994), which provides in pertinent part: "Any person ... aggrieved by a final decision 
of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding, whether such decision is affirmative or 
negative in form, shall be entitled to a judicial review thereof ...." Id. 
65. Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 
N.E.2d 920, 922 (1949). 
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concerns.66 
One commentator has suggested that "[t]here appears to be no 
Massachusetts standing to secure judicial review of administrative 
agency decision where the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized 
and accorded standing where any merely non-economic injury was 
at issue."67 Sierra Club, with its recognition of "aesthetic and envi­
ronmental well-being" as sufficient injury for standing,68 has no 
counterpart in Massachusetts. Apparently, the Supreme Judicial 
Court does not intend to allow SCRAP to creep into Massachusetts 
case law; standing turns on economic or pecuniary harm.69 
The Supreme Judicial Court has also imposed a local version of 
the "zone of interests" test in assessing standing disputes. In Mas­
sachusetts Association of Independent Insurance Agents and Bro­
kers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance,7o the court ruled that 
injury alone was not enough: "A party has standing when it can 
allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regula­
tory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred."71 The 
reliance on Data Processing is obvious.72 The Supreme Judicial 
Court has routinely ruled that injuries attributable to business com­
petition are outside the zone of interests of various statutes.73 
It is worth noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa­
chusetts has not adopted the nexus and redressibility prongs of the 
federal test for standing. In effect, the Massachusetts concept 
seems frozen in time before the Data Processing era of the federal 
66. See Group Ins. Comm'n v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 381 Mass. 199,207,408 
N.E.2d 851, 857 (1980); Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 295, 367 N.E.2d 796, 800-01 (1977); South Shore 
Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363,367,220 N.E.2d 899, 901-02 
(1966). See generally Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Rac­
ing Comm'n, 342 Mass. 694, 175 N.E.2d 244 (1961). 
67. 40 ALEXANDER J. CELLA, MASSACHUSEITS PRAcncr SERIES § 1675, at 229 
n.S (1986). 
68. See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
69. Professor Cella has referred to the Supreme Judicial Court's reluctance to 
expand its concept of injury in fact as "cramped, constructed [sic], and niggardly" and 
has chided the court for its failure to "offer a full and complete explanation" for the 
difference with the federal doctrine. 40 CELLA, supra note 67, § 1675 at 230. 
70. 373 Mass. 290, 367 N.E.2d 796 (1977). 
71. Id. at 293, 367 N.E.2d at 799. 
72. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Data 
Processing. 
73. See Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 371 N.E.2d 728 
(1977); Everett Town Taxi, Inc. v. Board of Aldermen, 366 Mass. 534, 320 N.E.2d 896 
(1974) (discussing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268A); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of 
Appeal, 324 Mass. 427,429-30,86 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1949) (discussing Zoning Enabling 
Act). 
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doctrine. Injury in fact is economic or pecuniary in nature;74 this 
harsh standard for access negates the need for the nexus and 
redressibility tests developed by the United States Supreme Court. 
The zone of interests test operates, as it does in the federal system, 
to provide an additional, if infrequent, barrier to access. 
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF STANDING 
Barvenik and its progeny are also controversial because of 
their pronouncements regarding the evidentiary burdens associated 
with establishing or challenging standing at various stages of litiga­
tion.75 Simply put, more is expected of a party claiming standing at 
a summary judgment hearing than at a proceeding under Rule 12; 
more again is expected at the trial stage than at the pretrial stage. 
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that when standing 
is contested, "each element must be supported in the same way as 
any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the succes­
sive stages of the litigation. "76 The Barvenik line is better under­
stood after a closer look at the devices by which standing may be 
contested. 
A. Some General Considerations 
The doctrine of standing has both a prudential and a constitu­
tional function in litigation. The prudential component ensures the 
efficient administration of justice; the constitutional component 
promotes the separation of powers called for by Article III (at the 
federal level) and by Article XXX (of the Massachusetts Constitu­
tion). The doctrine's importance is reflected in the procedural flexi­
bility attached to it by the federal and Massachusetts courts. 
Initially, the trial courts are "obligated to determine that 
[plaintiffs have] adequate standing to present their . . . chal­
lenges."77 The court may not rely on mere technical compliance 
offered by the parties. "Bald assertions, or concessions, of counsel 
[will] not suffice. Standing is a mixed question of fact and law. To 
the extent that it is a question of fact, the court must find the facts 
74. Even Data Processing contains dictum to the effect that aesthetic, conserva­
tional, and recreational injury would suffice for standing. Association of Data Process­
ing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). 
75. As to the controversy, see Halley, supra note 13, at B3. 
76. Lujan 1/, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992). 
77. Church of Scientology Flag Servo Org., Inc. V. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 
598,607 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986). 
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and recite them in a fashion that will accommodate appellate re­
view."78 Consequently, the trial court has the power to dismiss the 
matter, upon motion, for lack of standing.79 Even where standing is 
stipulated by counsel,80 or where no objection to standing is 
raised,81 the trial court may accomplish this result sua sponte.82 
The appellate level shares in this responsibility to police the 
court system, and has powers similar to those of the trial court. The 
United States Supreme Court stated in FWIPBS, Inc. v. City ofDal­
las83 that 
every federal appellate court has a special obligation to "satisfy 
itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower 
courts in a cause under review," even though the parties are pre­
pared to concede it. "And if the record discloses that the lower 
court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, 
although the parties make no contention concerning it."84 
The parties, too, have clearly delineated roles. The party 
claiming standing bears the burden of proof when the issue is con­
tested.85 "[S]tanding cannot be 'inferred argumentatively from 
averments in the pleadings,' but rather 'must affirmatively appear 
in the record. "'86 The party opposing standing has an opportunity 
78. Id. (footnote omitted). 
79. See Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 881 (1990) (regarding a motion for summary judg­
ment); Trustees of Worcester State Hosp. v. Governor, 395 Mass. 377, 380,480 N.E.2d 
291,293 (1985) (regarding a motion to dismiss); Doe v. Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 704, 
412 N.E.2d 325, 326-27 (1980) (same). 
80. Church of Scientology, 777 F.2d at 606. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., National Union of Hosp. and Health Care Employees v. Carey, 557 
F.2d 278,280-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Illinois Sporting Goods Ass'n 
v. County of Cook, 884 F. Supp. 275, 282 (N.D. III. 1995); Borkowski v. Fraternal Order 
of Police, 155 F.R.D. 105, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
83. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
84. Id. at 231 (quoting Bunder v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 
(1986» (citations omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has endorsed 
this position. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 412 Mass. 
243, 248, 588 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1992) ("Standing to raise an issue ... that involves 
subject matter jurisdiction ... may be raised ... by an appellate court on its own 
motion.") (citations omitted). Cf. Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,709,470 
N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984) ("A trial judge's findings concerning whether a person is ag­
grieved should not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.") (citing MASS. R. 
Ov. P. 52(a»; Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 217, 326 
N.E.2d 348,353 (1975). 
85. Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). See also FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 231; Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). 
86. FWIPBS,493 U.S. at 231 (citations omitted). 
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to raise the issue at any time during the proceedings.87 A challenge 
to standing can even be raised by a party for the first time at the 
appellate leve1.88 
With these practical considerations in mind, the federal and 
Massachusetts courts, in assessing standing, have routinely stated 
what the evidentiary expectations of the plaintiff are at various 
stages of the litigation. In order to add perspective to Barvenik and 
its progeny, a detailed review of these devices is in order. 
B. Rule 12(b) 
Rule 12(b )89 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
states, in relevant part, that "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a 
claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the respon­
sive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) 
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; ... (6) Failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted."90 
In Lujan II, the United States Supreme Court summarized the 
plaintiff's evidentiary obligations at this stage of the proceedings by 
stating that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of 
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a 
motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."'91 
"When a defendant challenges standing via a motion to dismiss, 
'both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material 
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in 
favor of the complaining party."'92 
87. See, e.g., Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1484 
(10th Cir. 1995); Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th 
Cir. 1993); Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 131 n.6. 597 N.E.2d 
48, 50 n.6 (1992). 
88. Prudential-Bache, 412 Mass. at 248. 588 N.E.2d at 642. The court noted that 
"a party may not argue for the first time on appeal that an opponent lacks standing to 
raise a constitutional issue that was presented below without any objection to the 
party's standing." Id. (citing Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 244, 247, 516 
N.E.2d 137, 139 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988». This, apparently, is one of 
the few limitations in raising the issue of standing. 
89. MASS. R. CIv. P. 12(b). For purposes of this discussion, reference to Rule 
12(b) shall be deemed reference to the identical federal and state rules. 
90. Id. 
91. Lujan ll, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan 1,497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990». 
Lujan I is an equally important decision in the genre of standing. 
92. Sanner v. Board of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin,422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975». 
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois had a recent opportunity to explain the general standards 
governing a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss: 
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)[] does not test 
whether the plaintiff will prevail on the merits but instead 
whether the claimant has properly stated a claim. . .. The court 
must accept as true all well-plead factual allegations and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. However, the 
court need not strain to find favorable inferences which are not 
apparent on the face of the complaint. Similarly, the court is not 
required to accept legal conclusions either alleged or inferred 
from pleaded facts. Finally, the complaint need not specify the 
correct legal theory nor point to the right statute to survive a 
Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, provided that "relief is possible 
under any set of facts that could be established consistent with 
the allegations." The complaint must, however, state either di­
rect or inferential allegations concerning all material elements 
necessary for recovery under the chosen legal theory.93 . 
These standards apply whether a motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).94 
Notwithstanding the similarities between motions to dismiss 
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), there are considerable dif­
ferences between them, the chief of which is explained within Rule 
12(b): 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claini upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.95 
In essence, the submittal of affidavits and other matters outside the 
pleadings converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment.96 Without such submittals, the general standards appli­
93. PAC for Middle Am. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 95 C P>27, 1995 WL 571887, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22,1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 
953 F.2d 1073,1078 (7th Cir. 1992». For an example of the Massachusetts statement of 
this standard, see Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96,98, 360 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1977). 
94. Sanner, 62 F.3d at 923-25. 
95. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b). 
96. For a wealth of decisions addressing the issue of standing pursuant to a mo­
tion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), see Humane Soc'y v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338, 345-46 
(Q. Int'l Trade 1995), and the cases cited therein. 
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cable to Rule 12(b) motions remain in force. 
On the other hand, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is not converted 
into a motion for summary judgment by the submittal of extra 
pleading materials.97 One of the important distinctions between a 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and a dismissal pursuant to 
12(b)( 6) is that under 12(b )(1) "the court is not restricted to the 
face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affida­
vits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the exist­
ence of jurisdiction to hear the action."98 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
recently explained the district court's procedural requirements 
under a Rule 12(b )(1) illotion: 
[T]he district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for dis­
covery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the 
motion to dismiss. Thus, some courts have refused to grant such 
a motion before a plaintiff has had a chance to discover the facts 
necessary to establish jurisdiction. Other courts have refused to 
uphold such a motion where-absent an incurable defect in the 
complaint-the plaintiff has had no opportunity to be heard on 
the factual matters underlying jurisdiction. And, although [Rule] 
43(e) allows factual motions to be heard on the basis of affidavits 
alone, a judge may be required to hear oral testimony where the 
facts are complicated and testimony would be helpful. . .. Inso­
far as the defendant's motion to dismiss raises factual issues, the 
plaintiff should have an opportunity to develop and argue the 
facts in a manner that is adequate in the context of the disputed 
issues and evidence.99 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has taken the same 
basic view of Rule 12(b)(l) motions.1°O 
C. Rule 56 
Rule 56( c )101 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
97. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
98. 2A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE <J[ 12.07 [2.-1], at 12-49 
to 12-50 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted). 
99. Williamson v. Thcker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 
(1981) (citations and footnote omitted). 
100. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. 
App. Ct. 657, 642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 421 Mass. 106,653 
N.E.2d 589 (1995). The decision is discussed in greater detail in part V, infra. 
101. MASS. R. CIv. P. 56(c). For purposes of this discussion, reference to Rule 
56(c) and (e) shall be deemed a reference to both the federal and state rules, which 
have only slight differences in style. 
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states, in relevant part, that a party is entitled to summary judgment 
in his or her favor if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter­
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."l02 Rule 56(e) provides that: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth spe­
cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him.103 
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (Lujan 1),104 the 
United States Supreme Court explained its expectations under Rule 
56: 
"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of sum­
mary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon mo­
tion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Where no such showing is made, "[t]he moving party is 
'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmov­
ing party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential 
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of 
proof."10S 
Furthermore, it is 
clear that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negate 
the elements of the nonmoving party's case; to the contrary, "re­
102. Id. The federal counterpart shares the same language. See FED. R. CIv. P. 
56(c). 
103. MASS. R. CIv. P. 56(e). The federal rule differs only slightly. FED. R. CIV. P. 
56( e) provides: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. 
Id. 
104. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
105. Id. at 884 (citations omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986». 
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gardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary . 
judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be 
granted so long as whatever is before the district court demon­
strates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as 
set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."106 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court endorsed the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan II, when it emphasized the evi­
dentiary burden on the plaintiff to come forward with evidence re­
garding standing.107 "In response to a summary judgment motion 
... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but 
must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,' which 
for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be 
true."108 When affidavits accompany the motion, the court is free 
to scrutinize these submittals to ensure that each and every element 
of standing is proven.109 Thus, in both Lujan decisions, the 
Supreme Court rejected standing for the plaintiffs because their af­
fidavits contained no facts showing the imminent required injury.11o 
These standards with regard to summary judgment are consistent 
with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of 
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 56.111 
D. Post-pleadings 
When the issue of standing is contested after the pleading 
stage, the party asserting standing has the burden of proof. The 
United States Supreme Court has noted that "at the final stage, 
[this claim] (if controverted) must be 'supported adequately by the 
evidence adduced at trial."'112 Generally, in civil matters, the party 
106. Id. at 885 (quoting Ce/otex, 477 U.S. at 323). 
107. Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992), quoted in Barvenik v. Board of Alder­
men, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 n.9, 597 N.E.2d 48, 51 n.9 (1992). 
108. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted). 
109. See, e.g., Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 888. In Lujan I, the Court concluded that "[i]n 
ruling upon a Rule 56 motion, 'a District Court must resolve any factual issues of con­
troversy in favor of the non-moving party' only in the sense that, where the facts specifi­
cally averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the 
motion must be denied." Id. In a standing contest, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
alleging specific facts to demonstrate injury: "The object of this provision is not to re­
place the conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations 
of an affidavit." Id. 
110. Id. at 885-89; Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 563-64. 
111. See Town of Norwood v. Adams-Russell Co., 401 Mass. 677,680,519 N.E.2d 
253,255 (1988); Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 370-71, 436 N.E.2d 139, 142-43, 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982). 
112. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell­
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979». 
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with the burden of proof "must persuade the fact finder that its 
contention is more probably true than false."113 This is the classic 
formulation of the "preponderance of the evidence standard."114 
E. Conclusion 
Taken together, these procedural devices make it clear that the 
issue of standing may be raised at any point in the proceedings. 
The burden of persuasion operates on a sliding scale, moreforgiv­
ing at the early stages, more stringent at trial. Thus, even where the 
trial court has made a Rule 12 or Rule 56 determination of stand­
ing, the issue may be reassessed at the trial stage.l15 Plaintiffs main­
tain a continuing obligation to demonstrate their requisite stake in 
the outcome. Failure to prove standing may result, even at the ap­
pellate stage, in dismissal of the action. 
III. PRE-BARVENIK STANDING UNDER THE ZONING Acr 
In zoning, adjudicatory decisions are made by administrative 
agencies. Thus, the standing of the plaintiff to contest a decision is 
113. HON. PAUL J. LIACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 
§ 5.2.1, at 198 (6th ed. 1994). 
114. Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 
827 (1940). 
After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition is proved by a prepon­
derance of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the 
sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the 
mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger 
there. 
[d. 
In Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 n.8, 597 N.E.2d 48, 
51 n.8 (1992), Justice Laurence raised the issue of the proper burden of persuasion in a 
standing contest. He noted that "[n]o case has clearly articulated the measure of the 
plaintiffs' burden in proving the requisite aggrievement." [d. He went on to suggest, 
without so holding, that the preponderance of the evidence standard might be appropri­
ate. [d. 
It is likely that the preponderance of the evidence standard suffices in this regard. 
The alternative "clear and convincing evidence" standard has been imposed primarily 
in other contexts. See LIACOS ET AL., supra note 113, §§ 5.2.2-.2.6 at 200-06. If a trial 
court decision is appealed, the reviewing court is limited to the evidence in the trial 
court record. Since the courts have not articulated a standard with regard to the quan­
tum of evidence required to survive a post-trial standing challenge, it is unclear what 
the measure would be. Because the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and because 
a reviewing court may address the issue of standing sua sponte, a plaintiff may be un­
able to meet the burden, regardless of the quantum of proof required, if the issue is 
addressed for the first time at the appellate level. 
115. Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 689, 642 N.E.2d 
314, 316 (1994), review denied, 419 Mass. 1106, 646 N.E.2d 1070 (1995); Jaffe v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 931, 612 N.E.2d 693,695 (1993). 
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a relevant consideration. As far back as the 1933 codification of the 
Zoning Enabling Act,116 only "persons aggrieved" have been per­
mitted to maintain an action in the appropriate courts. 
The first decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
to explore the nuances of the "person aggrieved" requirement was 
Circle Lounge &' Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal,l17 The Supreme 
Judicial Court fashioned a two-part approach to the question of 
standing. First, a person aggrieved must be "one whose legal rights 
have been infringed."118 In essence, the party claiming standing 
must show some special injury. The appeals court stated this test 
more succinctly in Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning 
Board:119 "Individual or corporate property owners acquire stand­
ing by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private 
right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest."120 As 
a general principle, pre-Barvenik decisions honored the warning 
that "[t]he words 'person aggrieved' ... are not to be narrowly 
construed."121 
116. See 1933 MASS. Acrs 269, § 1. 
117. 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d 920, 921-22 (1949). An earlier decision, God­
frey v. Building Comm'r, 263 Mass. 589, 590, 161 N.E. 819,820 (1928), reviewed stand­
ing to challenge a Boston rezoning. 
118. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 430, 86 N.E.2d at 922. 
119. 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 540 N.E.2d 182, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542 
N.E.2d 602 (1989). 
120. Id. at 492-93, 540 N.E.2d at 184. 
121. Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,204,143 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1957). 
As a reflection of its liberal interpretation of "person aggrieved" status, the Massachu­
setts Appeals Court has held that tenants are not barred, per se, from claiming standing. 
Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Mass. App. a. 1005.1006.476 N.E.2d 241, 242 
(1985). The parallel standing provision of the Subdivision Control Law. MASS. GEN. L. 
ch. 41, § 81BB (1994), has been interpreted to allow mortgagees and purchasers with 
equitable interests to claim standing. Carey v. Planning Bd., 335 Mass. 740, 743, 139 
N.E.2d 920,922-23 (1957). 
On the other hand, the court has proposed several rules to limit standing. Parties 
claiming injury in fact may be restricted by the linear limitation intimated in Boston 
Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 63 n.17, 371 N.E.2d 728, 746 n.17 
(1977) (the court expressed "grave doubts about granting standing to any person whose 
property interest is approximately 1800 feet ... away from the site" in issue). The court 
has been consistently hostile to standing for corporations without a demonstration of 
some harm to corporate legal rights. An unincorporated association cannot gain stand­
ing to be a party to a lawsuit. Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 496 
n.9, 540 N.E.2d at 186 n.9. Several cases have involved ad hoc "citizens groups" seeking 
standing to challenge permit decisions. See, e.g., id. at 496, 540 N.E.2d at 185-86; Chon­
gris v. Board of Appeals, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999, 999, 459 N.E.2d 1245, 1246 (1984); 
Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827, 
296 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1973). "[A] statement of organizational purpose cannot clothe a 
civic association with aggrieved person status." Chongris, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 999, 459 
N.E.2d at 1247. The organization must locate individual plaintiffs with aggrieved per­
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The second prong of the standing test requires an analysis of 
the "peculiar legal rights ... intended to be given to the plaintiff by 
the statute permitting an appeal."122 Few decisions tum on this sec­
ond prong, but several cases hold that the prevention of injury from 
business competition is not within the purposes of the Zoning 
ACt.123 Similarly, the court has held that the Zoning Act does not 
protect "a proprietor in a less restricted zone ... [from] the intro­
duction into a more restricted zone of any use permitted in the zone 
in which the proprietor's property is located."124 The court has 
taken an ad hoc approach to other c1aims.125 This inquiry is roughly 
equivalent to the "zone of interest" test, announced by the United 
States Supreme Court in Association ofData Processing Service Or­
ganizations v. Camp .126 
son status to carry the ball. Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 496, 
540 N .E.2d at 186. It is not necessary for the judge to. detennine· that all of the named 
plaintiffs have standing, as long as one of the plaintiffs qualifies. Murray v. Board of 
Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 n.7, 494 N.E.2d 1364, 1367 n.7 (1986). 
While the phrase "person aggrieved" will not be narrowly construed, "[i]t [is] not 
enough [to] have ... a general civic interest in the enforcement of the zoning ordi­
nance." Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 218, 326 N.E.2d 348, 
353 (1975) (citing Amherst Growth Study Comm., 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 827, 296 N.E.2d 
at 718). See also Green v. Board of Appeals, 404 Mass. 571, 574, 536 N.E.2d 584, 586 
(1989) (reaching the same result for an individual seeking to enforce the ordinance or 
by-law). 
122. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 431, 86 N.E.2d at 923. 
123. Id. at 429-30, 86 N.E.2d at 922; Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 
Mass. App. Ct. 274, 276-77, 473 N.E.2d 716, 717-18, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477 
N.E.2d 595 (1985); Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 385, 416 
N.E.2d 543,544 (1981); Waltham Motor Inn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 217, 326 N.E.2d at 353. 
124. Circle Lounge, 324 Mass. at 432, 86 N.E.2d at 923. The plaintiff, located in a 
business district, objected to a variance granted to construct a restaurant on nearby 
residentially-zoned property. The restaurant would have been allowed in the business 
district. The court stated that:· 
The residence zone ... was established to protect that zone against business 
and manufacturing uses. It was not established to protect the plaintiff's restau­
rant, which is located in a business zone. The residence zone was designed to 
protect residence against business. It was not designed to protect business 
against business. Therefore it would be an anomaly to confer upon the plain­
tiff peculiar legal rights against a business of a kind pennitted in the zone 
where its property is. 
Id. 
125. See Reeves v. Board of Zoning Appeal, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 1011, 1012, 455 
N.E.2d 447,449 (1983) (holding that possible future injury under a Cambridge rent 
control ordinance does not render plaintiff a person "aggrieved" under the Zoning 
Act). 
126. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Camp holds that if the interest the plaintiff seeks 
to protect is "arguably within the zone of interests" that Congress intended to protect 
or regulate by the relevant statute, then the plaintiff is an appropriate person to com­
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The key inquiry is the claimed injury.127 In the absence of any 
specific evidence on the question, the court has relied on two rules 
of reason. "Parties in interest," as set forth in Massachusetts Gen­
eral Laws, chapter 40A, section 11, enjoy a presumption of stand­
ing.128 The statute defines a "party in interest" as "the petitioner, 
abutters, owners of land directly opposite on any public or private 
street or way, and abutters to the abutters within three hundred feet 
of the property line of the petitioner as they appear on the most 
recent applicable tax list."129 Additionally, a nearby owner of prop­
erty lying in the same or in a substantially similar type of zoning 
district enjoys a similar presumption of injury when seeking to up­
hold the character of the district.130 
Where a presumption exists, it must be placed in its proper 
perspective. "If the issue is contested, and any additional evidence 
is offered, the point of jurisdiction will be determined on all the 
evidence with no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption as 
SUCh."131 The court has stated that the presumption "recedes if the 
issue is contested."132 When this occurs, the burden of proof is on 
the party claiming standing.133 In general, "[a] trial judge's findings 
of aggrieved person status are entitled to deference."l34 
The survey which follows is not intended to be a comprehen­
plain of the injury and has standing. Id. at 153. See supra part I discussing the Camp 
decision. 
127. A claim of injury is not forfeited by an aggrieved person who negotiates with 
the petitioner for a maximum price of her nearby property. Bedford v. Trustees of 
Boston Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372,377-78,518 N.E.2d 874,877 (1988). 
128. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4OA, § 11 (1994). See Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 
Mass. 199, 204, 143 N.E.2d 270, 273 (1957); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. 
App. Ct. 55, 58, 596 N.E.2d 369,371 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 415 Mass. 329, 613 
N.E.2d 893 (1993); Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. 
Ct. 491, 495, 540 N.E.2d 182, 185-86, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204, 542 N.E.2d 602 
(1989); Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. O. 473, 476, 494 N.E.2d 1364, 1366 
(1986); Gordon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 347, 494 N.E.2d 14, 
17, review denied, 398 Mass. 1103,497 N.E.2d 1096 (1986); Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. 
App. O. 707, 709, 470 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984); Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 210, 214, 326 N.E.2d 348, 352 (1975). 
129. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 11 (1994). 
130. Waltham Motor Inn, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 214-15, 326 N.E.2d at 352. See also 
Vainas v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 594, 150 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1958); Reynolds v. 
Board of Appeal, 335 Mass. 464,469-70,140 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957). 
131. Marotta, 336 Mass. at 204, 143 N.E.2d at 274. 
132. Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 385, 416 N.E.2d 543, 
544 (1981). See also Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. O. at 58, 596 N.E.2d at 371. 
133. Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 276, 473 
N.E.2d 716, 717, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985). 
134. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 59,596 N.E.2d at 372. See also Paulding v. 
Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,709,470 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1984). 
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sive summary of all zoning and standing cases in the years between 
Circle Lounge and Barvenik. Some cases mention the issues with­
out discussion.135 Others end up in a remand.136 Readers versed in 
zoning law will undoubtedly agree that the major decisions have 
been included. 
A. Parties in Interest . 
Those contests involving parties in interest reported from the 
pre-Barvenik era yielded fairly predictable results. Parties in inter­
est were generally vindicated by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. 
In ten of the fourteen reported cases, "aggrieved person" status was 
accorded. 
In most of the favorable decisions, standing was awarded be­
cause the proposed development had a direct impact on a protected 
right or interest.137 In others, it is unclear whether the party in in­
terest was awarded standing because of direct harm or because they 
sought to preserve the integrity of their residential zoning dis­
trictS.138 In several of these decisions, the court evaluated the plain­
tiffs' standing despite the defendants' failure to present sufficient 
evidence, or in several cases any evidence, contesting the issue.139 
This would, of course, leave the presumption of the plaintiffs' stand­
ing in place. In eight of these ten decisions, standing was upheld 
135. See, e.g., Walker v. Board of Appeals, 388 Mass. 42, 445 N.E.2d 141 (1983). 
136. See, e.g., Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1005, 476 
N.E.2d 241 (1985). 
137. See Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371 (interference 
with water views and loss of value); Cummings v. City Council, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 
350,551 N.E.2d 46, 50 (holding that plaintiff might be able to prove "tangible harm"), 
review denied, 407 Mass. 1102,554 N.E.2d 851 (1990); Bedford v. Trustees of Boston 
Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 377, 518 N.E.2d 874, 877 (1988) (proposed construction of 
building would lead to traffic and parking problems and would create shadows); 
Gordon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 347, 494 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 
(holding that proposed development shares right of way with plaintiff and will be 
cleared), review denied, 398 Mass. 1103, 497 N.E.2d 1096 (1986); Paulding, 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399 (erosion, flooding, tree damage); Butts v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 249, 253, 464 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1984) (complete destruc­
tion of water view). 
138. See Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,203-05, 143 N.E.2d 270, 
273-74 (1957); Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473,476,494 N.E.2d 
1364, 1366-67 (1986); Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 995, 418 
N.E.2d 635, 637 (1981); Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629-30, 
367 N.E.2d 856, 859-60 (1977). 
139. Murray,22 Mass. App. Ct. at 476, 494 N.E.2d at 1367; Butts, 18 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 253, 464 N.E.2d at 112; Owens, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 995, 418 N.E.2d at 637; 
Rafferty,5 Mass. App. Ct. at 629-30, 367 N.E.2d at 859-60. 
408 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:385 
after trial.140 ;Of the two remaining decisions, one was before the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court after the granting of a motion to dis­
miss141 and the procedural status of the other case142 is neither com­
mon nor likely to be repeated. 
There were four reported decisions in which parties in interest 
were not granted standing.143 Three of these decisions involved cir­
cumstances in which the court reasonably concluded that the nature 
of the injury had more to do with business competition than a pro­
tected right or interest. l44 The other, Baxter v. Board ofAppeais,145 
is instructive. The special permit under attack authorized six dwell­
ing units. The plaintiffs' claims were summarized by the court: 
[F]irst, that the locus, although long filled in, had once been sub­
ject to tidal action; was, therefore, tideland; and that a license 
had not been obtained for revised use, conformably with G.L. c. 
91, § 18.... A second concern, on the part of one of the plain­
tiffs, was about fish smells from a proposed fish store on the lo­
cus, but a fish store was permissible as a matter of right . . . . 
Other concerns of the plaintiffs fell in the category of planning 
opinions, e.g., "Well I don't like the way it's laid out over there 
and it shouldn't be, I don't think," and, "[w]ell, cutting out the 
140. Marotta, 336 Mass. at 205,143 N.E.2d at 274; Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371-72; Bedford, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 376-77, 518 N.E.2d at 877; 
Murray, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 476, 494 N.E.2d at 1366-67; Gordon, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 
347,494 N.E.2d at 17-18; Paulding, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399; Owens, 
11 Mass. App. Ct. at 995, 418 N.E.2d at 637; Rafferty, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 629-30, 367 
N.E.2d at 859-60. 
141. Cummings, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 349-50, 551 N.E.2d at 49. 
142. Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 250, 464 N.E.2d at 110 ("The history of the litiga­
tion is lengthy and complicated procedurally."). 
143. Baxter v. Board of Appeals, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993, 994-95, 562 N.E.2d 841. 
842 (1990); Sherrill House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274,276-77,473 
N.E.2d 716, 717-18, review denied, 394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985); Redstone v. 
Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 384, 416 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1981); Waltham 
Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 217, 326 N.E.2d 348, 353 (1975). 
144. Sherrill House, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 276-77, 473 N.E.2d at 717-18 (noncon­
fonning nursing horne in residential district without standing to defend district's integ­
rity); Redstone, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 384, 416 N.E.2d at 543 (competing bank appeals 
award of variance to another bank across street; property "could barely be seen" from 
plaintiff's land); Waltham Moto;'Inn, 3.Mass. App. Ct. at 217, 326 N.E.2d at 353 (com­
peting motel operators challenge special pennit for hotel). 
145. 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993,562 N.E.2d 841 (1990). The court was not comforta­
ble with the description of the plaintiffs as "aggrieved persons" because there was "con­
siderable obscurity" in the records as to their receipt of statutory notice. Id. at 994, 562 
N.E.2d at 842. Nonetheless, the court did acknowledge the rebuttable presumption on 
the plaintiffs' behalf. Id. 
409 1996] THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD 
views of other people in the park ... " and "[s]houldn't be so 
dense."146 
The lower court ruled, after trial, that these claims were insufficient. 
The appeals court agreed. 
B. Legitimate Interest in Preserving the Integrity of the District 
A second presumption of standing exists for those persons with 
a "legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the district,"147 
whether or not they suffer a distinct injury.148 The presumption is 
available only to plaintiffs who reside in the same district as the 
project they oppose.149 In the years since its origin, only four re­
ported decisions have turned exclusively on this presumption.1so In 
all of the decisions, the plaintiffs were awarded standing. lSI 
C. No Presumption 
In all five reported decisions falling chronologically between 
Circle Lounge and Barvenik, plaintiffs who were without the bene­
fit of either presumption were denied standing. lS2 In four of these 
decisions, plaintiffs were, or were part of, ad hoc citizen associations 
seeking zoning enforcement.lS3 In the fifth decision, Green v. 
146. Id. at 994-95, 562 N.E.2d at 842. Any practitioner active in the representa­
tion of abutters will recognize these remarks. 
147. Murray v. Board of Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476, 494 N.E.2d 1364, 
1367 (1986). 
148. Id.; Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 995, 418 N.E.2d 635, 
637 (1981); Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629-30, 367 N.E.2d 
856, 860 (1977). 
149. Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 
495,540 N.E.2d 182, 186, review denied, 405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989). 
150. But see supra note 138. 
151. See Smith v. Board of Appeals, 340 Mass. 230, 231-32, 163 N.E.2d 654, 656 
(1960); Vainas v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 594, 150 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1958); 
Colabufalo v. Board of Appeal, 336 Mass. 213, 217, 143 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1957). The 
presumption originated in Reynolds v. Board of Appeals, 335 Mass. 464, 470, 140 
N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957) ("[P]laintiffs ... are entitled to assert their interest in having the 
... district in which they own real estate and reside maintained as [a residential 
dlstnct . . · .] .."). 
152. This figure includes neither Circle Lounge itself, nor Godfrey v. Building 
Comm'r, 263 Mass. 589, 593, 161 N.E. 819, 821 (1928), a fairly ancient case. One is 
tempted to add to this figure the original plaintiffs dismissed from the action in Rafferty. 
See Rafferty, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 625-26,367 N.E.2d at 857. 
153. See Harvard Square Defense Fund, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 493-94,540 N.E.2d 
at 185; Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999,459 N.E.2d 1245 (1984); 
Owens v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 994,418 N.E.2d 635 (1981) (several 
plaintiffs have no presumption and are dismissed; one abutter is allowed to proceed); 
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Board ofAppeals,lS4 a single plaintiff sought enforcement of a zon­
ing by-law. Clearly, the "party in interest" and "integrity of the 
district" presumptions were critical to the issue of standing during 
this time frame. 
D. Conclusion 
Standing in the pre-Barvenik era appears quite predictable. Of 
the eighteen situations reviewed by the court in which plaintiffs en­
joyed the benefit of a presumption, fourteen resulted in decisions 
upholding standing. In two of the four cases in which presumptive 
standing was rebutted and standing denied, the plaintiffs were busi­
ness competitors of the defendant permittee; in another, the plain­
tiff operated a nonconforming use in a residential district. On the 
other hand, in all of the reported decisions in which plaintiffs were 
without presumptive standing, the court determined that the matter 
should be dismissed. . 
A closer look reveals a few surprising considerations. First, in 
all seven decisions in which plaintiffs sought to uphold the integrity 
of the district in which they resided, they were successful; this was 
true whether they were parties in interest (three cases) or more re­
motely situated neighbors (four cases). In each case, the district in 
question was residentially zoned. The court gave great leeway to 
those within the same district seeking to maintain its character. 
Second, in many of the presumptive standing decisions involv­
ing injury in fact, the defendants simply failed to submit enough 
evidence to rebut the presumption. ISS In Paulding v. Bruins1S6 and 
Butts v. Zoning Board ofAppeals,IS7 the court did not comment on 
the defendants' evidence at all, asserting only that the plaintiffs had 
met their evidentiary burden. In Baxter v. Board of Appeals, the 
anomaly of the pre-Barvenik era, it was not the strength of the de­
fendant's evidence as much as the plaintiffs' weak showing that car­
ried the day. ISS Only Bedford v. Trustees ofBoston University,lS9 of 
Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 826-27, 
296 N.E.2d 717, 717-18 (1973). 
154. 404 Mass. 571, 536 N.E.2d 584 (1989). 
155. See Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 596 N.E.2d 369 
(1992), affd in relevant part, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993); Murray v. Board of 
Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 494 N.E.2d 1364 (1986). 
156. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707,470 N.E.2d 398 (1984). 
157. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 249,464 N.E.2d 108 (1984). 
158. See Baxter v. Board of Appeals, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 993, 562 N.E.2d 841 
(1980). 
159. 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 518 N.E.2d 874 (1988). 
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the cases involving injury in fact, was a true contest- ,­
Third, notwithstanding the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court's strict view, some of the appeals court decisions hint at a 
softening of the rule requiring economic or pecuniary harm. Not 
every party in interest claimed economic or pecuniary injury. For 
example, the plaintiff in Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals160 claimed 
loss of view, as did the plaintiff in ButtS.161 The plaintiffs in Paul­
ding cited "fears of erosion, flooding, and damage to the trees on 
their 10t."162 These claims are reminiscent of the "aesthetic, recrea­
tional or conservational" injury endorsed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Sierra Club, but roundly rejected by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in its standing decisions.163 
These SCRAP-like intrusions into the case law occur without 
elaboration by the appeals court. Was the 'appeals court con­
sciously endorsing noneconomic harm as grounds for standing in a 
zoning dispute? Or were these simply instances in which the de­
fendants' evidentiary presentations opened the door for plaintiffs? 
The latter position has more support in a close reading of the cases. 
This is confirmed in Barvenik, which makes it clear that the more 
expansive federal view of standing has no place in the Common­
wealth.164 
IV. BARVENIK AND ITS PROGENY 
In a series of cases commencing with Barvenik v. Board ofAl­
dermen, the Massachusetts Appeals Court fundamentally altered 
forty-three years of practice and procedure.165 Barvenik makes two 
160. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 58-59, 596 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329, 
613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). 
161. See Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 253, 464 N.E.2d at 112. In Tsagronis, the 
plaintiff offered uncontroverted opinion that the loss of view would diminish the value 
of his land. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 58, 596 N.E.2d at 371. In Butts, the loss of 
water view was total. Butts, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 253,464 N.E.2d at 112. 
162. Paulding, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 709, 470 N.E.2d at 399. The drainage claim 
probably fits within the concept of economic harm, but damage to vegetation is more of 
an aesthetic injury. 
163. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also discussion supra 
part I.B analyzing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decisions. 
164. See Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129,597 N.E.2d 48 
(1992). 
165. Id. The other decisions in this line include: Riley v. Janco Cent., Inc., 38 
Mass. App. Ct. 984, 652 N.E.2d 631 (1995), review denied, 421 Mass. 1108,659 N.E.2d 
287 (1996); Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956, 642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994); 
Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 641 N.E.2d 125 (1994), 
affd, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & 
Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd 
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key contributions to the doctrine of standing. First, Barvenik firmly 
rejects any suggestion in Tsagronis, Paulding or Butts that noneco­
nomic harm alone is a sufficient basis for standing. Second, the de­
cision signals that plaintiffs will be required to demonstrate 
standing by appropriate proof at every stage in the proceedings. 
These two themes are consistently repeated by the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court in the decisions of the Barvenik line.. 
Barvenik involved a typical spat between neighbors and a suc­
cessful permit applicant. Plaintiffs were various landowners living 
near the site of a former school, which was to be converted to 114 
housing units for the elderly, as authorized by a special permit is­
sued by the Board of Aldermen. The site was zoned for multi-fam­
ily use. The plaintiffs resided in a single family residence district; 
they complained that the development of the site would create a 
general increase in traffic and noise, change the character and ap­
pearance of the neighborhood, and result in drainage problems.l66 
After a seven-day trial, the land court upheld the standing of five of 
the plaintiffs to contest the special permit, but affirmed the local 
decision for the permittees on its merits.167 
The appeals court ruled that it need not reach the merits of the 
case because the plaintiffs were without standing to contest the 
matter.168 The court noted that the plaintiffs, as parties in interest, 
were entitled to a presumption of aggrieved person status.169 Addi­
tionally, the court reiterated the consequences of a contest: 
Once a defendant ... offers evidence to support the challenge ... 
the jurisdictional issue is to be decided on the basis of the evi­
dence with no benefit to the plaintiff from the presumption. The 
plaintiff then has the burden of proof on the issue of standing. 
in part, 421 Mass. 106,653 N.E.2d 589 (1995) (further appellate review was granted­
the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is discussed in part V of this Article, infra); C0­
hen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 624 N.E.2d 119 (1993), review 
denied, 417 Mass. 1102,631 N.E.2d 58 (1994); Jaffe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 34 Mass. 
App. Ct. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (1993). 
166. Barvenik,33 Mass. App. Ct. at 134 n.ll, 597 N.E.2d at 52 n.ll. 
167. The standing of the plaintiffs was challenged by the defendants in pretrial 
motions, without success. Id. at 131 n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6. In its post-trial decision, 
the lower court ruled that five abutter plaintiffs had standing, but that the remaining 
plaintiffs did not. 
168. Id. at 130, 597 N.E.2d at 50. Defendants "extensively briefed the issue" on 
appeal. "Plaintiffs' brief on appeal did not discuss the subject of standing." Id. at 131 
n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6. This certainly did not improve the plaintiff's chances. 
169. Id. at 131,597 N.E.2d at 50. Because the plaintiffs resided in a different (and 
not substantially similar) zoning district, the second presumption, favoring those seek­
ing to uphold the integrity of the district, was not available. Id. at 139,597 N.E.2d at 55. 
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Satisfaction of that burden requires proof that the plaintiff is one 
of the limited class of individuals who are entitled to challenge a 
zoning board's exercise of discretion.17o 
Here, however, the tone of the court significantly departed from 
past standing decisions. First,the court gave short shrift to most of 
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries, stating that "[ s ]ubjective and un­
specific fears about the possible impairment of aesthetics or neigh­
borhood appearance, incompatible architectural styles, the dimin­
ishment of close neighborhood feeling, or the loss of open or 
natural space are all considered insufficient bases for aggrievement 
under Massachusetts law."171 The court characterized these con­
cerns as "sincere," but concluded that it was "angst insufficient" for 
standing.172 . 
In contrast, the court identified "legitimate zoning-related con­
cerns, including possible vehicular traffic increases, anticipated 
parking problems, and the potential for litter."173 In order to prove 
the special and different kind of injury necessary for standing, a 
plaintiff must show that these legitimate zoning-related concerns 
will result 
if not in a diminution in the value of his property, at least in his 
property or legal rights being more adversely affected by the ac­
tivity authorized by the permit than (a) they are by present uses 
and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses and 
activities permitted as of right on the defendant's locusP4 
Otherwise, even a party in interest lacks standing. 
Barvenik's purge of noneconomic injuries from standing has 
some troubling aspects. The appeals court's contention that aes­
thetic harm is "considered [an] insufficient bas[i]s for aggrievement 
under Massachusetts law" is, no doubt, grounded in the decisions of 
the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed in Part I of this Article.175 
However, it fails to account for 1975 Massachusetts Acts 808, sec­
170. Id. at 131-32, 597 N.E.2d at 50-51 (footnotes omitted). 
171. Id. at 132-33, 597 N.E.2d at 51. See also id. at 134 n.l1, 597 N.E.2d at 52 
n.l1. The court took pains to distinguish the Commonwealth's doctrine of standing 
from "more expansive" federal law. Id. at 132 n.9, 597 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. 
172. Id. at 135, 597 N.E.2d at 52-53. 
173. Id. at 133, 597 N.E.2d at 51. 
174. Id. The court offered no legal precedent for its alternative measures of in­
jury in the absence of diminished value. They are grounded in common sense, in that a 
plaintiff cannot complain of injury where the new activity would be less onerous than 
the existing use and less onerous than uses available as of right. 
175. Id. at 132-33,597 N.E.2d at 51. See also id. at 134 n.11, 597 N.E.2d at 52 
n.11. See discussion supra part I. 
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tion 2A, which states that zoning may be used to accomplish aes­
thetic goals: 
This section is designed to suggest objectives for which zoning 
might be established which include, but are not limited to, the 
following: - to lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve 
health; to secure safety from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; 
to provide adequate light and air; to prevent overcrowding of 
land, to avoid undue concentration of population; to encourage 
housing for persons of all income levels; to facilitate the adequate 
provision of transportation, water, water supply, drainage, sewer­
age, schools, parks, open space and other public requirements; to 
conserve the value of land and buildings, including the conserva­
tion of natural resources and the prevention of blight and pollu­
tion of the environment; to encourage the most appropriate use 
of land throughout the city or town, including consideration of 
the recommendations of the master plan, if any, adopted by the 
planning board and the comprehensive plan, if any, of the re­
gional planning agency; and to preserve and increase amenities 
by the promulgation of regulations to fulfill said objectives. Said 
regulations may include but are not limited to restricting, prohib­
iting, permitting or regulating: 
1. uses of land, including wetlands and lands deemed sub­
ject to seasonal or periodic flooding; 
2. size, height, bulk, location and use of structures, includ­
ing buildings and signs except that billboards, signs and 
other advertising devices are also subject to the provisions of 
sections twenty-nine through thirty-three, inclusive, of chap­
ter ninety-three, and to chapter ninety-three D; 
3. uses of bodies of water, including water courses; 
4. noxious uses; 
5. areas and dimensions of land and bodies of water to be 
occupied or unoccupied by uses and structures, courts, yards 
and open spaces; 
6. density of population and intensity of use; 
7. accessory facilities and uses, such as vehicle parking and 
loading, landscaping and open space; and 
8. the development. of the natural, scenic and aesthetic 
qualities of the communityP6 
Section 2A has been cited as a guide to the legitimate exercise of 
the zoning power.!77 Nowhere does section 2A subordinate 
176. 1975 MASS. Acrs 808, § 2A. 
177. See MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 386 Mass. 339, 341,435 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 
(1982); Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 253, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1350-51 
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noneconomic to economk objectives.118 In fact, the Supreme Judi­
cial Court of Massachusetts has ruled that the police power is 
properly exercised even when the sole governmental objective is 
aesthetic in nature.179 
It is open to contention that, by legitimizing economic harm 
and ignoring aesthetic injury, the court has lost sight of the changes 
to zoning law dating from the mid-1970s. Why does "potential for 
litter" constitute a legitimate zoning-related concern while "impair­
ment of aesthetics or neighborhood appearance" does not? Both 
share equal billing in section 2A. Is it because the court sees a link 
between litter and the diminution of property values that is not ap­
parent when considering aesthetic impacts? This approach ignores 
a wealth of case law that points in the opposite direction. For ex­
ample, in Chorzempa v. City ofHuntsville,180 the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld a municipal junkyard ordinance grounded 
in aesthetics and economics, stating that "current authorities recog­
nize neighborhood aesthetics to be integrally bound to property 
values and to be relevant considerations in zoning when they bear 
in a substantial way upon land utilization."181 Similarly, in State ex 
reI. Columbia Tower, Inc. v. Boone County, 182 the court ruled that 
aesthetic considerations were "inextricably entwined with property 
values." Recent commentary indicates that the diminution in prop­
(1980); Hunters Brook Realty Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 
81,436 N.E.2d 978,982 (1982). These extensive powers "are not to be narrowly inter­
preted." Collura v. Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. 881, 885, 329 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1975) 
(citing Decoulos v. City of Peabody, 360 Mass. 428. 429, 274 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1971». 
See also Sturges, 380 Mass. at 253 n.ll, 402 N.E.2d at 1351 n.ll. 
178. Section 2A may serve to distinguish zoning from other administrative con­
texts in which standing is an issue. In Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 
Mass. 37, 46, 371 N.E.2d 728, 737 (1977), quoted in Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491,493 n.5, 540 N.E.2d 182,185 n.5, review denied, 
405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989), the court noted that "when an issue involves an 
area of law governed by a specific statute with a standing requirement, that issue is 
governed by the standing requirements of the particular statute and not by a general 
grant of standing." The court cited the Zoning Act as an example of such a "specific 
statute." Boston Edison, 374 Mass. at 46, 371 N.E.2d at 737. 
179. John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 218, 339 
N.E.2d 709, 717 (1975) (ruling that a Brookline measure addressing billboards was 
valid). 
180. 643 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 
181. Id. at 1024 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 205 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964». 
182. 829 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). See also Coscan Washington, Inc. v. 
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 590 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1991). 
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erty value caused by aesthetic harm can readily be quantified.183 
Barvenik's dismissal of aesthetic harm without explanation fails to 
account for the trend linking aesthetics with property values.184 
Barvenik's second contribution to the doctrine of standing is its 
clear statement of the Massachusetts Appeals Court's evidentiary 
expectations. The "plaintiff must establish-by direct facts and not 
by speCUlative personal opinion-that his injury is special and dif­
ferent."185 The plaintiff must "offer more than conjecture and hy­
pothesis. He must provide specific evidence demonstrating a 
reasonable likelihood" of injury.186 Citing Lujan II, Justice Lau­
rence calibrated his evidentiary expectations to the stage of 
litigation.187 
The court also commented on the need for expert testimony to 
prove legitimate zoning-related concerns: 
As a cautionary observation, we do not intend to suggest that 
plaintiffs asserting zoning aggrievement can never succeed, once 
their standing is contested, without producing expert witnesses 
on their behalf. The need for expert testimony depends, as in all 
cases, upon the trial judge's discretionary determination whether 
or not the subject matter is beyond the scope of the common 
knowledge, experience and understanding of the trier of fact 
without expert assistance. Here, the judge acknowledged the 
value of expert testimony with respect to the issues of traffic and 
water distribution and expressly noted that the issues of water 
pressure, site drainage, storm drainage, and landscaping were 
"technical questions" and "specialized matters. "188 
The issues deemed technical in the trial court cover considerable 
ground in virtually every zoning appeaL While the court stops short 
183. See, e.g., George P. Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: 
An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVIL. L. REV. 53 (1991). 
'''[There is] no lack of data for making adjustments based on aesthetic factors. View 
and proximity to a noxious use are just other variables in the marketplace the measure­
ment of which is no more subjective than many other factors commonly valued.'" Id. at 
76 (quoting Interview with Arnold S. Tesh, Chairman of the Capital Region Chapter of 
the American Society of Real Estate Counselors, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17,1990)). 
184. Columbia Tower, 829 S.W.2d at 536. Indeed, in her influential article, Bev­
erly A. Rowlett argues that aesthetic concerns and diminution of property values are 
two sides of the same coin. See Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the 
Police Power: The New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 
VAND. L. REv. 603, 622-23 (1981). 
185. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132, 597 N.E.2d 48, 
51 (1992). 
186. Id. at 133, 597 N.E.2d at 5l. 
187. Id. at 133 n.9, 597 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. 
188. Id. at 138 n.13, 597 N.E.2d at 54 n.l3 (citation omitted). 
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of requiring expert testimony, a prudent plaintiff is left with little 
option. 
The evidentiary expectations of the court come to life in its 
review of the trial testimony of the plaintiffs.189 In a long footnote, 
the court dismissed the testimony of the five abutters as "'the ex­
pression of aesthetic views and speculative opinions."'19o The first 
plaintiff's fear of traffic impacts was not limited to the project in 
question; it related to any project" 'up in that area. "'191 The second 
plaintiff objected primarily to the appearance and density of the 
elderly housing proposal.192 Another was concerned about neigh­
borhood charaeter.193 For the fourth plaintiff, loss of the site as rec­
reational land and noise were key.194 The last neighbor cited 
neighborhood character and unsubstantiated traffic concerns.195 
The court conceded that one of the plaintiffs alluded to a fear of 
increased water drainage onto his site, "a fear which would, if sub­
stantiated, have constituted cognizable injury on which to base 
standing."196 However, the defendant's uncontested expert testi­
mony regarding drainage demonstrated that run-off would not be a 
problem.197 
Barvenik evokes two reactions. The first is that the decision is 
consistent with evidentiary and doctrinal precedent in the area of 
standing.198 Barvenik purges noneconomic injury from standing in 
keeping with the Supreme Judicial Court's rule.199 It states, in reli­
ance on Lujan II, the same evidentiary burden on plaintiffs as does 
the United States Supreme Court. The other reaction is the source 
of its controversy. Simply put, Barvenik restores an intellectual 
189. The court also discussed the amount and nature of the evidence necessary to 
destroy the plaintiffs presumption of aggrievement. Id. at 132 n.7, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.7. 
The court cited various standards without endorsing any particular one. Id. 
190. Id. at 134 n.11, 597 N.E.2d at 52 n.11 (quoting Harvard Square Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493, 540 N.E.2d 182, 185, review 
denied,405 Mass. 1204,542 N.E.2d 602 (1989». 





196. Id. at 137, 597 N.E.2d at 54. 
197. Id. at 138, 597 N.E.2d at 54. 
198. The one caveat would be Justice Laurence's test for injury, which was never 
based on precedent, and which was rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa­
chusetts in Marashlian. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660 
N.E.2d 369 (1996). See also discussion infra part V. 
199. For a discussion criticizing this rule, see supra notes 175-84 and accompany­
ing text. 
418 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:385 
rigor to the issue of standing. As Part III of this Article reviews, 
reported challenges in the pre-Barvenik era were rare. Plaintiffs 
generally survived because defendants either failed to contest the 
issue or did so insufficiently.20o Only ten days before Barvenik, the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the standing of a plaintiff 
whose only evidence of injury-diminution of value caused by loss 
of view, no less-was his own testimony.201 In this complacent at­
mosphere, where presumptions reigned, it is understandable that 
Barvenik represented a shocking change in tone. 
A. Subsequent Decisions by the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court remained remarkably con­
sistent in its approach to the issue of standing in the three years 
following Barvenik. The court was presented with opportunities to 
explore the issue in various contexts: motions to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b )(1), motions for summary judgment, and, like Barvenik, 
at the post-trial stage. The decisions since Barvenik were notable 
chiefly for their contributions to evidentiary issues. The important 
aspects of these later decisions are reviewed below. 
In laffe v. Zoning Board ofAppeals ,202 the court examined the 
standing of Thomas and Luan White, who had complained to the 
board that certain zoning violations existed on the Jaffes' property. 
The board agreed with the Whites, and the Jaffes appealed. The 
property of the Whites was located in a single-family residence dis­
trict; the Jaffes resided in a district zoned for multi-family use. The 
distance between the two premises was 480 feet, with seven houses 
separating the parties. On the Jaffes' motion for summary judg­
ment, the trial court ruled that the Whites were without standing to 
bring the action because they did not own property in the same 
district.203 
Only nine months earlier, in Barvenik, the Massachusetts Ap­
peals Court had noted that "no cases have yet recognized standing 
in such plaintiffs."204 Now, a different panel of the appeals court 
ruled that, while no presumption benefitted the Whites, standing 
200. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. 
201. Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 596 N.E.2d 369 (1992), 
rev'd, 415 Mass. 329,613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). Tsagronis was decided on July 24, 1992. 
See id. 
202. 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929,612 N.E.2d 693 (1993). 
203. Id. at 930, 612 N.E.2d at 694. 
204. Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129,139 n.15, 597 N.E.2d 
48, 55 n.15 (1992). This was an issue raised, but left unanswered, in Barvenik. Id. 
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was not barred if they could demonstrate the requisite injury. The 
Whites submitted no affidavits from experts. Instead, Thomas 
White's affidavit alleged that noise emanating from the Jaffes' 
premises and an increase in pedestrian traffic had caused diminu­
tion in his property values. The court ruled that the claim of in­
creased pedestrian traffic, regardless of its effect on values, "may 
have an impact on a party's property interest so as to give him 
standing."205 Thus, the Whites barely satisfied the evidentiary 
threshold required at the summary judgment stage.206 The matter 
was remanded for trial. 
Cohen v. Zoning Board ofAppeals207 is the Massachusetts Ap­
peals Court's definitive post-Barvenik treatment of standing in the 
context of a trial court's summary judgment. The panel wrestled 
with a multi-party appeal of a special permit. The special permit 
authorized the construction of a shopping center in an area zoned 
"arterial commercial."208 The plaintiffs were the owners of two 
nearby parcels, both within the same district as the subject par­
cel.209 One of the plaintiffs' parcels, home to a Dunkin' Donuts, 
abutted the site. A supermarket was planned for development on 
the non-abutting vacant parcel. On cross motions for summary 
judgment, the judge of the land court ruled that the abutting plain­
tiffs did not have the requisite injury for standing. The judge also 
held that the non-abutting plaintiffs were precluded from standing 
by virtue of their business competition with the permittee.210 
The trial court, and the appeals court on review, relied on the 
United States Supreme Court's Lujan II ruling to measure the 
plaintiffs' claims.211 The court first ruled that the defendants' evi­
205. Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. at 931, 612 N.E.2d at 695. However, the laffes 
noted, in their appellate brief, that the Whites live across the street from Boston Col­
lege and dormitories which house approximately 900 students. Brief for Appellants at 
9, Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (No. 91-P-183). 
206. Jaffe, 34 Mass. App. O. at 931, 612 N.E.2d at 695. The court suggested that 
if diminution in value were White's only complaint, he may not have presented suffi­
cient evidence to withstand summary judgment. Id. 
207. 35 Mass. App. O. 619,624 N.E.2d 119 (1993), review denied, 417 Mass. 1102, 
631 N.E.2d 58 (1994). 
208. Id. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 120. 
209. Id. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 121. 
210. Id. at 621 n.3, 624 N.E.2d at 121 n.3. The appeals court did not reach the 
issue of whether a business competitor is always precluded from status as an aggrieved 
person. 
211. [d. at 621, 624 N.E.2d at 121. See Lujan 11,504 U.S. 555 (1992). The court 
noted that Lujan II is consistent with Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 
706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734, 740 (1991). 
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dence, consisting of deposition transcripts, was sufficient to destroy 
the plaintiffs' presumption of standing. The plaintiffs, in turn, al­
leged that traffic impacts from the proposed shopping center would 
adversely affect their properties.212 They submitted an affidavit 
from a professional traffic engineer to buttress their claim of injury. 
The appeals court, as did the land court before it, shredded the affi­
davit. The engineer predicted that the proposed shopping center 
would cause "increased delays in traffic flow, a reduced ability of 
patrons of Dunkin' Donuts to make left turns ... and a likelihood 
that, because of lines of vehicles on [the] street, ... patrons will be 
impeded from getting in or out of the Dunkin' Donuts parcel."213 
The court characterized this affidavit as focusing on the impact of 
traffic on "patrons of the Dunkin' Donuts parcel."214 The predic­
tion was flawed because it did not identify injury to the owners of 
the parce1.215 Over the plaintiffs' argument that the court was im­
posing too stringent a Rule 56 standard,216 the trial court was af­
212. In addition to raising traffic as grounds for standing, the plaintiffs made two 
lesser claims. They alleged that they were aggrieved by the failure of the shopping 
centers to conform to the site grading and topography requirements of the zoning by­
law. Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 620, 624 N.E.2d at 121. Furthermore, as land owners 
in the same district, they claimed that they were entitled to standing because they 
sought to preserve the integrity of the district. This latter contention came too late in 
the game. Id. at 624, 624 N.E.2d at 123. In any event, the plaintiffs did not identify the 
interest they sought to protect. Id. at 624 n.5, 624 N.E.2d at 123 n.5. 
213. Id. at 623, 624 N.E.2d at 122. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. The plaintiffs' appellate brief noted that "[t ]he opinion of an expert is not to 
be dismissed as a 'generalized assertion of opinion' so long as it is 'sufficiently substan­
tial ... to raise an apparent issue of fact' and if so, it will suffice to avoid summary 
judgment." Brief for Appellants at 22 n.7, Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 624 N.E.2d 
119 (No. 93-P-785) (quoting Noble v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 34 Mass. App. 
Ct. 397, 4()3, 612 N.E.2d 250, 254, review denied, 415 Mass. 1105, 616 N.E.2d 469 
(1993». The footnote continued by paraphrasing Noble: 
The Court in Noble held that in opposing a motion for summary judgment a 
plaintiff need not show a "perfect case": "[a] reasonable measure of doubt 
may be tolerated because 'all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary 
judgment.'" 
Id. at 22-23 n.7 (citing Noble, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 402, 612 N.E.2d at 254 (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted». 
The plaintiffs' brief makes many of the same arguments as those rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Lujan I and Lujan II. Justice Blackmun dissented in both decisions. 
In Lujan I, he wrote: 
The requirement that evidence be submitted is satisfied here. . . . There re­
mains the question whether the allegations in these affidavits were sufficiently 
precise to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e). The line of demarcation 
between "specific" and "conclusory" allegations is hardly a bright one .... 
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firmed. "In the circumstances, the general and conclusory 
allegations of the affidavit cannot be transformed by inference into 
genuine triable issues."217 
Two of the Massachusetts Appeals Court's post-Barvenik 
standing decisions invited further appellate review.218 In the first, 
Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n,219 the 
appeals court ruled that abutters to a proposed home for mentally 
handicapped persons were not aggrieved. The appeals court, noting 
that matters outside the pleadings had been presented to the trial 
judge at the hearing, erroneously characterized the defendant's mo­
tion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b )(1) as a motion for summary 
judgment.22o The court, citing Barvenik and Lujan II, then applied 
the tougher standards associated with Rule 56 to find that the plain-
The question, it should be emphasized, is not whether the [plaintiff] has 
proved that it has standing to bring this action, but simply whether the materi­
als before the [trial court] established "that there is a genuine issue for trial," 
concerning the [plaintiff's] standing. In light of the principle that "[o]n sum­
mary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained 
in [evidentiary] materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion," I believe that the evidence before the [trial court] 
raised a genuine factual issue as to [the plaintiff's] standing to sue. 
Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 902-03 (1989) (Blackmun. J., dissenting) (fourth and fifth altera­
tions in original) (citations omitted). See also Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 589-93 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
217. Cohen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 623, 624 N.E.2d at 122. 
218. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has also rendered three lesser decisions in 
which it has steadfastly applied Barvenik. See Riley v. Janco Cent., Inc., 38 Mass. App. 
Ct. 984,652 N.E.2d 631 (1995), review denied, 421 Mass. l1OS, 659 N.E.2d 287 (1996); 
Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 956, 642 N.E.2d 1054 (1994); Monks v. Zon­
ing Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685,642 N.E.2d 314 (1994), review denied, 419 
Mass. 1106, 646 N.E.2d 1070 (1995). Reagan and Riley are rescript opinions. Monks is 
arguably the most interesting of the three. On the standing question, the trial court 
issued summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court in Monks ruled 
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a special permit issued for a cellular phone 
tower measuring 180 feet in height and located approximately 1500 feet away from their 
home. The plaintiffs complained that the tower would cause a diminution in the value 
of their property, emit harmful microwaves, and impact the visual quality of the neigh­
borhood. Ordinarily, the court noted, the visual impact claim would not qualify a plain­
tiff for standing. In this case, however, the Plymouth zoning by-law specifically 
indicated that the board of appeals was to consider "the visual character or quality of 
the neighborhood" as a special permit criterion. Monks, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 688, 642 
N.E.2d at 316. This "created and defined a protected interest" which the plaintiffs had 
standing to assert. Id. 
219. 37 Mass. App. Ct. 657,642 N.E.2d 599 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 
421 Mass. 106,653 N.E.2d 589 (1995). 
220. Id. at 661-63, 642 N.E.2d at 602-03. See the Supreme Judicial Court's discus­
sion in Watros, 421 Mass. at 107-09,653 N.E.2d at 590-92, which is reviewed infra, part 
V. The Supreme Judicial Court corrected the procedural error and found that the 
plaintiffs had standing to proceed. 
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tiffs did not qualify for aggrieved person status.221 
The second decision accepted for further appellate review was 
Marashlian v. Zoning Board ofAppeals, a rescript opinion.222 The 
Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected standing for plaintiffs who 
claimed that a proposed complex would cause traffic and parking 
injuries. The lower court found; after the trial, that the plaintiffs 
had standing. The court also ruled that the permits in question 
were validly issued because the project would not cause traffic and 
parking problems. The appeals court characterized the trial court's 
ruling as inconsistent and erroneous.223 Where traffic and parking 
were not aggravated by the project, the appeals court determined 
that the matter should be dismissed for lack of standing. After trial, 
the plaintiffs' claimed injuries were demonstrably nonexistent. 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court's post-Barvenik decisions 
reveal an absolute reversal in this trend. In six of the eight deci­
sions (including Barvenik), the plaintiffs were denied standing. Five 
of the six rejected plaintiffs were parties in interest.224 This con­
trasts with a success rate of more than seventy percent for parties in 
interest in the pre-Barvenik era.225 Of the two successful plaintiffs, 
one was protected by a unique local by-law provision;226 the other 
was located 480 feet from the subject property.227 In both of these 
decisions, rendered by the trial courts in the context of a motion for 
summary judgment, the Massachusetts Appeals Court was quick to 
point out that a Rule 56 determination of standing does not pre­
221. Watros, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 664-66, 642 N.E.2d at 603-05. According to the 
appeals court, the plaintiffs 
submitted no affidavits or other material to establish the requisite adversity of 
impact to their peculiar rights. The unverified allegations of their complaint 
were entitled to no consideration in evaluating the matter, and provided no 
specific facts as to the impact of the proposed project on them in any event. 
Id. at 666, 642 N.E.2d at 604-05 (citations omitted). 
222. 37 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 641 N.E.2d 125 (1994), affd, 421 Mass. 719, 660 
N.E.2d 369 (1996). 
223. [d. at 932, 641 N.E.2d at 126. 
224. The plaintiff in Reagan-the other jilted claimant-was located more than 
one-half mile from the site in question. See Reagan v. Planning Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 
956,956,642 N.E.2d 1054, 1055 (1994). 
225. See discussion supra part III. Ten of 14 parties in interest were awarded 
standing in appellate decisions prior to Barvenik. 
226. See supra note 218 discussing Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mass. 
App. Ct. 685, 642 N.E.2d 314 (1994). 
227. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text discussing Jaffe v. Zoning 
Bd., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 612 N.E.2d 693 (1993). 
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elude a later assessment of the issue at the trial stage.228 In short, 
there is hardly any good news for plaintiffs. 
B. Trial Courts 
A survey of iand court decisions during the period from 1993 
to 1995, indicates that Barvenik had an enormous impact on the 
trial courts. The results are striking: 
FIGURE 1 





1993229 1994230 1995231 Total 
For Defendant 6 6 5 17 
For Plaintiff 1 1 4 6 
Most of the standing decisions, fourteen of twenty-three, were en­
228. [d. at 931,612 N.E.2d at 695; Monks, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 689,642 N.E.2d at 
316. 
229. Daddario v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 195 
(Mass. Land. Ct. Dec. 1, 1993); Herrick v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. 
Landlaw) 174 (Mass. Land. Ct. Sept. 21, 1993); Devereaux v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land 
Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 147 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 9, 1993); Napier v. Board of 
Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 144 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 5, 1993); Cohen v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 48 (Mass. Land Ct. April 26, 
1993); Bringhurst v. Planning Bd., 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 12 (Mass. Land Ct. 
Jan 22, 1993); Greene v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep (Mass. Landlaw) 8 
(Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 20, 1993). 
230. Siepel v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 151 
(Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 17, 1994); Century House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land 
Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 148 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 26, 1994); Covell v. Board of 
Appeals,2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 78 (Mass. Land Ct. May 9, 1994); Phelan v. 
Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 60 (Mass. Land Ct. April 6, 1994); 
Meharg v. Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 37 (Mass. Land Ct. Feb. 
7, 1994); Porter v. Town of Dartmouth, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 96 (Mass. 
Land Ct. Jan. 20, 1994); Waldron v. Dartmouth Planning Bd., 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. 
Landlaw) 3 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 5, 1994). 
231. Hirsch v. Board of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 238 (Mass. 
Land Ct. Dec. 27, 1995); Lucas v. Belmont Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. 
(Mass. Landlaw) 198 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 18, 1995); Wayland v. Andover Zoning Bd., 
3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 197 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 13, 1995); Nixon v. Ipswich 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 121 (Mass. Land Ct. June 13, 
1995); King v. Cambridge Bd. of Zoning Appeal, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 118 
(Mass. Land Ct. June 5, 1995); Rosenthal v. Millbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. 
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 115 (Mass. Land Ct. June 2, 1995); Howard v. Planning & Zoning 
Bd.,3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 77 (Mass. Land Ct. March 31, 1995); Connors v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 19 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 12, 
1995). 
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tered after trial. Nine of the decisions were entered at the summary 
judgment stage. No decisions were entered pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). 
Parties in interest generally fared quite poorly: 
FIGURE 2 





1993 1994 1995 Total 
1233Standing 5 
3236No Standing 12 
This trend is confirmed by a cursory check of decisions in the supe­
rior courts during the period from 1994 to 1995, as reported in Mas­
sachusetts Lawyers Weekly. In his feature article, Robert A. Cohen 
traced the impact of Barvenik on five trial decisions, all siding with 
defendants on the issue of standing.238 In four decisions of the su­
perior courts between 1994 to 1995, reported in Massachusetts Law­
yers Weekly, plaintiffs obtained standing in the pretrial stages of 
litigation.239 
232. Herrick, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 174. 
233. Siepel,2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 15I. 
234. Wayland, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 197; Rosenthal. 3 Land Ct. 
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 115; Connors, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) at 19. 
235. Daddario v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 195 
(Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 1, 1993); Devereaux v. Board of Appeal, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. 
Landlaw) 147 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 9, 1993); Napier v. Board of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. 
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 144 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 5. 1993); Bringhurst v. Planning Bd., 1 
Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 12 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 22, 1993); Greene v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals, 1 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 8 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan 20, 1993). 
236. Century House. Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. 
Landlaw) 140 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 26, 1994); Phelan v. Board of Appeals, 2 Land Ct. 
Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 60 (Mass. Land Ct. April 6, 1994); Waldron v. Dartmouth 
Planning Bd., 2 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 3 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 5, 1994). 
237. Hirsch v. Board of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 238 (Mass. 
Land Ct. Dec. 27, 1995); Lucas v. Belmont Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 3 Land Ct. Rep. 
(Mass. Landlaw) 198 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct 18, 1995); Sledz v. Tewksbury Planning Bd., 3 
Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 159 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 22, 1995); Howard v. 
Planning & Zoning Bd., 3 Land Ct. Rep. (Mass. Landlaw) 77 (Mass. Land Ct. March 31, 
1995). 
238. The decisions were collected and reported in Robert A. Cohen, Clearing the 
Standing Barrier in Boston Zoning Appeals, MASS. LAW WKLY., Aug. 15, 1994, at 33, 36. 
239. See Shaw Corp. v. Souza, 4 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L. Book Co.) 161 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. June 29, 1995); Serio v. Sturbridge Planning Bd., 4 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L. 
Book Co.) 70 (Mass. Super. Ct. April 28, 1995); Jamieson v. Pellegrini, 3 Mass. L. Rep. 
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C. Conclusion 
Barvenik obviously inspired considerable adherence in later 
panels of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and in the trial courts. 
At the appeals court, six of the eight subsequent decisions resulted 
in a finding that plaintiffs were without standing to contest the is­
sue. Of the twenty-three relevant decisions of the Massachusetts 
Land Court in the period from 1993 to 1995, nineteen cited 
Barvenik, including fourteen of the seventeen decisions that re­
sulted in a finding of no standing. 
v. BARVENIK AT 1HE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has been 
presented with three opportunities to review standing in the post­
Barvenik era. The first of these decisions, Tsagronis v. Board of 
Appeals, signaled the contentiousness of the issue later made ap­
parent in the third decision, Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Ap­
peals.240 The focus of the second post-Barvenik decision, Watros v. 
Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n, was primarily 
procedural and did not substantially alter the Barvenik test for in­
jury.241 In Marashlian, however, the Supreme Judicial Court modi­
fied two important aspects of the Barvenik decision. First, the court 
reduced the Barvenik "comparable uses" balancing test to a mere 
factor. Second, the court discouraged post hoc findings, based on a 
failure to succeed on the merits, that a plaintiff lacked standing. 
A. The Tsagronis Decision 
Tsagronis involved the standing of an adjoining landowner to 
challenge a variance issued for the construction of a single-family 
home on the last lot in a subdivision. Like the subject parcel, the 
plaintiffs' parcel was undersized and lacked the requisite frontage. 
In a decision rendered only eleven days before Barvenik, the Mas­
sachusetts Appeals Court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge the variance.242 By virtue of their status as abutters and 
because they resided in the same district as the subject parcel, the 
(Mass. L. Book Co.) 237 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1994); Sainato v. Ninety-Nine W., 
Inc., 2 Mass. L. Rep. (Mass. L. Book Co.) 601 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1994). 
240. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 
(1996); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). 
241. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 421 Mass. 
106, 653 N.E.2d 589 (1995). 
242. See Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59, 596 N.E.2d 369, 
371-72 (1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). 
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plaintiffs were presumptively aggrieved persons. The plaintiffs tes­
tified that the construction of the home would partially obstruct 
their views of Buzzards Bay, resulting in a diminution of value.243 
Defendants failed to produce any evidence to contradict these con­
tentions.244 As a result, the appeals court ruled that the evidence 
warranted a finding of standing. 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed in a divided opinion.245 
The court characterized the plaintiffs' testimony regarding ob­
structed views and diminished value as "uncontroverted."246 For 
the majority, this was determinative: "Indeed, on the uncontested 
facts, the status of aggrieved party probably is compelled as a mat­
ter of law."247 The dissent, however, was unsympathetic to the cru­
cial claim of pecuniary harm. The dissent pointed out that "[t]here 
was no evidence as to the value of the Tsagronises' [sic] lot at the 
time of the hearing or what the value might be after construction of 
the [defendant's] house, or whether the value would diminish even 
more if the locus were used for purposes not requiring a vari­
ance."248 In the dissent's view, the speculative opinion of the plain­
tiff did not constitute plausible harm. 
There is much in the Massachusetts high court's Tsagronis de­
cision to suggest that Barvenik had been well-received at the 
Supreme Judicial Court. Barvenik is not cited in Tsagronis, but the 
243. Id. at 58-59, 596 N.E.2d at 371. The dissent in the Supreme Judicial Court's 
Tsagronis decision noted that the plaintiffs also claimed harm from a diminution of light 
and air, air pollution,.erosion, and wastewater discharge. Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 335­
36 nn.2-3, 613 N.E.2d at 896-97 nn.2-3 (Abrams, J., dissenting). These issues were not 
discussed by the appeals court. 
244. Tsagronis, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 59, 596 N.E.2d at 372. 
245. Justices Abrams, Liacos, and Lynch dissented in this four to three decision. 
Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 329, 613 N.E.2d at 893. 
246. Id. at 330 n.4, 613 N.E.2d at 894 n.4. 
247. Id. The dissent suggested that the majority had "replaced the rebuttable 
presumption ... with an automatic standing rule." Id. at 336 n.4, 613 N.E.2d at 897 nA. 
However, the majority's position, grounded in the lack of evidence produced by the 
defendants at trial, cannot be said to go this far. After all, the presumption only "re­
cedes if the issue is contested." Redstone v. Board of Appeals, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 
385,416 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1981). Failure to' contest the issue would preserve the pre­
sumption, not automatic standing. See LIACOS ET AL., supra note 113, at 235 ("A pre­
sumption is rebuttable ... by evidence warranting a finding contrary to the presumed 
fact."). As the Massachusetts Appeals Court noted in several pre-Barvenik rulings, 
failure to contest standing leaves the presumption intact. See supra part III and accom­
panying text for a discussion of the pre-Barvenik rulings. 
248. Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 335, 613 N.E.2d at 896 (Abrams, J., dissenting). Ob­
viously, this again raises the spectre of obligatory expert testimony to demonstrate 
standing, here, presumably by an appraiser. See supra note 186 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this issue as raised in Barvenik. 
427 1996] THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD 
results are consistent, even complementary. The Tsagronis major­
ity subscribed to a principle often announced by the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court: Where the defendant fails to produce evidence suf­
ficient to contest the presumption of aggrieved person status, the 
presumption survives.249 Nothing in Barvenik contradicts this prin­
ciple. In fact, by delineating the evidentiary obligations of the par­
ties, Barvenik demands nothing less. 
The Tsagronis dissent also embraced elements of the Barvenik 
holding. To gauge the plaintiffs' claim of diminished value, the dis­
sent looked to alternative uses-here, campgrounds-that might, as 
of right, be placed on the site. This is consistent with Justice Lau­
rence's Barvenik formulation for injury in fact.250 The dissent also 
scrutinized the plaintiffs' various claims of harm, rejecting those in­
juries not related to typical zoning disputes or reducible to pecuni­
ary harm. Justice Laurence had reached similar conclusions 
regarding legitimate zoning injuries in Barvenik. In short, nothing 
in Tsagronis contemplates the Marashlian criticism of Barvenik. 
B. The Watros Decision 
The second of the Supreme Judicial Court's· post-Barvenik 
standing decisions focused on a narrow procedural question. In 
Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n, the 
court provided a blueprint for the treatment of motions to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro- . 
cedure.251 The Massachusetts Appeals Court characterized such a 
motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion where the mo­
vant had submitted extra-pleading materials.252 The Massachusetts 
Appeals Court, citing Barvenik and Lujan II, applied the tougher 
standards associated with Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Civil Procedure to find that the plaintiffs did not qualify for ag­
249. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Massa­
chusetts Appeals Court's handling of the issue of the presumption. 
250. In focusing on the other uses that might be made of the lot, the dissent asked 
the equivalent of the Barvenik test for injury: Whether the plaintiffs property or legal 
rights are "more adversely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a) 
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses and 
activities permitted as of right on the ... locus." Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 
Mass. App. Q. 129, 133,597 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1992). 
251. See Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 421 Mass. 
106, 653 N.E.2d 589 (1995). 
252. Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. App. 
Q. 657, 661-63, 642 N.E.2d 599, 602-03 (1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 421 Mass. 
106, 653 N.E.2d 589. 
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grieved person<status.253 The Supreme Judicial Court opted to ap­
ply the more lenient standards associated with Rule 12(b)(1) to find 
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the permits.254 The 
court noted that no evidence was presented by the defendants at 
the hearing to controvert the claim of standing.255 Thus, the plain­
tiffs "were entitled to rely entirely on their presumed status of being 
aggrieved parties. "256 Warros is best characterized as a procedural 
correction, not a repudiation, of the Barvenik line; it does not repu­
diate the substantive aspects of the doctrine. 
C. The Marashlian Decision 
Until 1996, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was 
content to let the appeals court's view of standing develop without 
significant comment. In Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 
however, the Supreme Judicial Court wrestled with several key 
components of the Barvenik decision.257 The facts of the matter are 
typical fare. The board of appeals issued a special permit and two 
variances for the development of a hotel with a conference center 
on Newburyport's waterfront. Two plaintiffs, each a party in inter­
est, sought judicial review. The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed 
development would cause disruption of neighborhood character, a 
shortage of parking spaces, attendant traffic congestion, and various 
problems (primarily noise and lighting) associated with the pro­
posed valet parking services.258 After trial, the judge ruled that the 
plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action but that the board had 
not exceeded its authority.259 In essence, the trial judge found that 
253. Id. at 664-66, 642 N.E.2d at 603-05. The court found that the plaintiffs 
submitted no affidavits or other material to establish the requisite adversity of 
impact to their peculiar rights. The unverified allegations of their complaint 
were entitled to no consideration in evaluating the matter ... and provided no 
specific facts as to the impact of the proposed project on them in any event. 
Id. at 666, 642 N.E.2d at 604-05 (citations omitted). 
254. The Supreme Judicial Court viewed the matter as governed by Rule 12(b)(I) 
despite the fact that summary judgment motions were also pending before the trial 
court. Watros. 421 Mass. at 108-09,653 N.E.2d at 591. In a brief discussion, the court 
pointed out that only Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are converted to Rule 56 mo­
tions by the submittal of such materials. Id. 
255. Id. at 111, 653 N.E.2d at 592. 
256. Id. at 111, 653 N.E.2d at 593. 
257. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 660 N.E.2d 369 
(1996). 
258. These facts are summarized in Marashlian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 37 
Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932, 641 N.E.2d 125, 126-27 (1994), affd, 421 Mass. at 719, 660 
N.E.2d at 369. 
259. Id. at 931, 641 N.E.2d at 126. 
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the proposed complex would not cause any of the alleged problems. 
Consequently, the special permit and variances were sustained on 
the merits; the complex would not detrimentally affect the area. 
The appeals court held that the trial judge's findings as to traf­
fic, parking and the valet service militated against standing.260 The 
appeals court's position was simple. The plaintiffs' claimed harm 
stemmed from traffic and parking. The trial resulted in a finding 
that there was no such harm: "Based on the judge's findings, [the 
plaintiffs] have failed to make a 'specific showing that the plaintiffs 
will either be injured or that such an injury would be special and 
different from that which others throughout the zone would experi­
ence . . . . "'261 In short, the appeals court ruled that it need not . 
reach the merits of the board's decision because the plaintiffs' 
claims of injury were not proved at trial. 
The appeals court's decision in Marashlian inspired some nega­
. tive reviews. Commentator Michael Halley, in Massachusetts Law­
yers Weekly, was quite blunt: 
The import of the Marashlian decision is a wholesale renuncia­
tion of the very concept of standing as a threshold, jurisdictional 
issue. The Appeals Court has held, in essence, that if a defendant 
prevails on the merits, after trial, the plaintiff never had standing 
to bring the claim in the first place.262 
Mr. Halley argued that "[a]ggrievement ... means, if anything, a 
colorable claim, not certain guaranteed success."263 
This is the point of view that ultimately prevailed at the 
Supreme Judicial Court in its Marashlian decision. Chief Justice 
Liacos, who sided with the dissent in Tsagronis, wrote the majority 
opinion. He cited Barvenik for the proposition that "[i]f standing is 
challenged, the jurisdictional question is decided on 'all the evi­
dence with no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption. "'264 
However, Chief Justice Liacos noted that: 
[A] review of standing based on "all the evidence" does not re­
260. Id. at 933, 641 N.E.2d at 127. 
261. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 623, 

624 N.E.2d 119, 122-23 (1993), review denied, 417 Mass. 1102,631 N.E.2d 58 (1994». 

262. Halley, supra note 13, at B4 (endnote omitted). Given that standing can be 

raised "at any time," Mr. Halley's characterization of standing as a threshold issue is 

more a statement of expectation than requirement. 

263. Id. 
264. Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 421 Mass. 719, 721,660 N.E.2d 369, 

372 (1996) (quoting Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 131, 597 

N.E.2d 48, 50 (1992». 
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quire that the factfinder ultimately find a plaintiff's allegations 
meritorious. To do so would be to deny standing, after the fact, 
to any unsuccessful plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff must put forth 
credible evidence to substantiate his allegations. In this context, 
standing becomes, then, essentially a question of fact for the trial 
judge.265 
It is plausible that a trial judge may conclude that the facts warrant 
both a finding of standing and an adverse ruling on the merits. 
Marashlian suggests that these are not inherently inconsistent 
results. 
In this regard, Marashlian resuscitates the oft-repeated propo­
sition that "[t]he words 'person aggrieved' ... are not to be nar­
rowly construed. "266 . On several occasions, the court reminds us 
that "[t]he findings of the judge should not be overturned unless 
'clearly erroneous. "'267 As the Supreme Judicial Court noted, the 
appeals court's Marashlian decision turned on a reinterpretation of 
the trial judge's findings, which otherwise supported standing for 
the plaintiffs.268 In general, "[a] trial judge's findings of aggrieved 
person status are entitled to deference."269 The rulirig of the ap­
peals court did not comport with this standard. 
The court used this opportunity to correct another key aspect 
of the Barvenik ruling. Justice Laurence had fashioned a threshold 
test for injury in fact. Plaintiffs must show: 
[S]pecific evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that 
the [decision] will result, if not in a diminution in the value of his 
property, at least in his property or legal rights being more ad­
versely affected by the activity authorized by the permit than (a) 
they are by present uses and activities or (b) they would be as a 
result of the uses and activities permitted as of right on the ... 
locus.27o 
. As noted in Part IV of this Article, this test is founded in pragma­
tism, not precedent.271 To the Barvenik panel, common sense dic­
tated that the plaintiff had no claim of injury where a new or 
265. Id. 
266. Marotta v. Board of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199,204,143 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1957). 
267. Marashlian,421 Mass. at 722, 660 N.E.2d at 372. 
268. Id. at 723, 660 N.E.2d at 373. 
269. Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 59, 596 N.E.2d 369, 372 
(1992), rev'd, 415 Mass. 329,613 N.E.2d 893 (1993). See Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. 707, 709,470 N.E.2d 398,399 (1984). 
270. Barvenik v. Board of Aldennen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133,597 N.E.2d 48, 
51 (1992). 
271. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
431 1996] THE ZONING ACT'S "PERSON AGGRIEVED" STANDARD 
proposed activity would be less onerous than the existing use, or 
less onerous than uses available as of right. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts limited the Barvenik 
formulation: 
This line of cases appears to be a departure from those previously 
decided . . . . We decline to adopt such a rule, except to the 
extent that it requires specific facts to establish perceptible harm. 
Although the magnitude of the threat of harm to a potential 
plaintiff in retation to the threat of harm from a use permissible 
as of right is a factor that may be considered, it is not dispositive 
of the standing issue.272 
For this proposition, Chief Justice Liacos cited Justice Abrams's dis­
sent in Tsagronis, in which he joined.273 Justice Abrams had argued 
in Tsagronis that the failure to consider the impact of alternative, or 
as of right, uses on the subject parcel exposed the defects in the 
plaintiffs' claim of diminished value.274 However, he did not sug­
gest that this analysis was a required element of every standing 
contest.275 
Marashlian, then, rejects two key aspects of the Barvenik line. 
First, in a clear message to trial judges, the court reduced the bal­
ancing test offered by Justice Laurence-focusing on comparable 
uses-to a mere factor. The court held that this test should not be 
determinative of the outcome without rejecting its application in 
some form. Second, in an equally clear message to the appeals 
court, the decision suggests that a finding after trial of standing for 
plaintiffs is best left undisturbed. Where the trial judge's findings 
are supported in the record, the usual standards of appellate review 
demand deference. A decision on the merits for the permittee, cou­
pled with a decision that the challengers nonetheless had standing 
to bring suit, is not inherently inconsistent. 
The Marashlian dissent was composed of Justice O'Connor, its 
author, and Justices Lynch and Greaney. Only Justice Lynch held 
over from the Tsagronis dissent.276 The dissent did not necessarily 
272. Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 724, 660 N.E.2d at 373. 
273. Id. See Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 334-35, 613 N.E.2d at 896 (Abrams, J., dis­
senting). Chief Justice Liacos also cited Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Ap­
peal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). 
274.' Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 334 & n.1, 613 N.E.2d at 896 & n.1 (Abrams, J., 
dissenting). 
275. Id. at 335-36, 613 N.E.2d at 896-97. 
276. The dissent objected to the trial judge's announced reliance on Sherrill 
House, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 274,473 N.E.2d 716, review denied, 
394 Mass. 1103,477 N.E.2d 595 (1985). See Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 727, 660 N.E.2d at 
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disagree with the majority's prescription for deference. The dissent, 
however, conceded only that the judge made the following relevant 
findings: 
(1) "The number of parking spaces to be provided for the Project 
will be sufficient to meet the parking demands generated by the 
hotel. Therefore, the Project will not add to any existing onstreet 
parking congestion in the area"; (2) "[T]he supply of public park­
ing spaces in the area will be adequate to meet the demand"; (3) 
"With respect to traffic, the [P]roject is expected to minimally 
increase traffic volumes and ... site-generated traffic will not 
have a major impact on area traffic patterns. Any adverse traffic 
impacts will be controlled by implementing certain mitigation 
measures. "277 
The dissent pointed out that there were no findings "suggesting that 
the zoning board's actions are likely to result in harm to the plain­
tiffs' legally protected interests."278 Consequently, the appeals 
court's rescript opinion was characterized as appropriately deferen­
tial. The judge had simply made an erroneous conclusion of law in 
determining that his findings, although warranted, demonstrated 
the plaintiffs' standing. In the dissent's view, the lower court's rul­
ing was not entitled to the deference demanded by the majority. 
CONCLUSION 
Reaction to Marashlian was immediate. In the January 29, 
1996 edition of Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, commentator Wil­
liam V. Hovey summarized that the Marashlian decision shows "the 
very confused state of the law regarding who is an 'aggrieved per­
son' for purposes of challenging a variance .... The courts have 
been all over the place on the standing issue-backwards, sideways 
375 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The trial judge ruled, citing Sherrill House, that "[e]ven 
if Snow and Marashlian were to prove no more than the likelihood of fear of harm on 
the part of themselves, their visitors, clients and employees, they have standing to main­
tain this action." Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the portion of Sherrill House relied 
upon, however, was dictum, and. thus, the "judge's reasoning and ruling were incor­
rect." Id. Furthermore. these types of "fears" (Sherrill House involved the siting of a 
correctional facility) would "tend to diminish the market value of the Plaintiff's prop­
erty," unlike the fears of Snow and Marashlian, which had to do with a hotel complex. 
Id. at 728,660 N.E.2d at 375. 
277. Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 729-30, 660 N.E.2d at 376 (O'Connor, J., dissent­
ing) (alterations in original). A few other relevant, but minor, findings were also 
detailed. 
278. Id. 
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and upside down."279 Hovey added that standing remains "a 
chicken or the egg" problem: "[I]t is difficult to give definite advice 
to a client who is considering a zoning challenge. "280 
With a bit more time to ponder the issue, some post-Marash­
lian considerations do emerge from the confusion. First, in the 
realm of evidentiary expectations, Marashlian makes only a minor 
adjustment to Barvenik. The decision certainly does nothing to dis­
turb Barvenik's insistence upon rigorous proof of standing. 
Marashlian, several times, demands "credible evidence to substanti­
ate [the plaintiffs'] allegations."281 This is consistent with 
Barvenik's statement of the evidentiary burden: The "plaintiff must 
establish-by direct facts and not by speculative personal opinion­
that his injury is special and different."282 There must be "specific 
evidence demonstrating a reasonable likelihood" of injury.283 
Marashlian undoubtedly preserves the Lujan II calibration of this 
evidentiary burden, appropriate to the stage of litigation. 
Marashlian also keeps intact the Barvenik concept of "legiti­
mate zoning-related concerns" sufficient to provide standing.284 
The plaintiffs' claim to standing turned on injuries attributable to 
traffic and parking impacts. Justice Laurence had specifically cited 
"possible vehicular traffic increases [and] anticipated parking 
problems" as "legitimate" concerns.285 The Supreme Judicial 
Court's Tsagronis decision, particularly the dissent, is also consis­
tent with this formulation for zoning aggrievement. In the post­
Marashlian era, "the possible impairment of aesthetics or neighbor­
hood appearance, incompatible architectural styles, the diminish­
ment of close neighborhood feeling, or the loss of open or natural 
space" are not bases for standing.286 
Marashlian does, however, slightly alter the evidentiary focus 
attending injury in fact. Barvenik had suggested that in order to 
prove the special and different kind of injury necessary for standing, 
a plaintiff must show that these legitimate zoning-related concerns 
279. Mark A. Cohen, Neighbors Challenge Variances For Hotel, Appeals Court 
View On Standing Reversed, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 29, 1996, at AI, A35. 
280. Id. 
281. Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721,660 N.E.2d at 372. 
282. Barvenik v. Board of Aldennen, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132, 597 N.E.2d 48, 
51 (1992). 
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will result if not in a diminution in the value of his property, at 
least in his property or legal rights being more adversely affected 
by the activity authorized by the permit than (a) they are by pres­
ent uses and activities or (b) they would be as a result of the uses 
and activities permitted as of right on the defendant's locus.287 
Marashlian reduces this balancing test to a factor for consideration. 
Otherwise, Marashlian ensures that the spirit of Lujan II will per­
vade the trial courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
Marashlian's second realm reminds the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court of the deference due to a trial judge's findings. To the extent 
that this aspect of Marashlian is read narrowly, there is no funda­
mental inconsistency with Barvenik. The findings of a lower court 
cannot be disturbed unless· "clearly erroneous." Chief Justice 
Liacos cited Building Inspector v. Sanderson288 for the appropriate 
standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."289 Further, 
[i]n applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a 
[trial] court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must con­
stantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual 
issues de novo. The authority of an appellate court, when re­
viewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is cir­
cumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier 
of the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and 
weigh the evidence. The question for the appellate court under 
Rule 52(a) is not whether it would have made the findings the 
trial court did, but whether "on the entire evidence [it] is left with· 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."29o 
Read narrowly, Marashlian merely reiterates that where the trial 
judge finds standing warranted by the evidence, the appeals court, 
except in the rare case, must accede. 
However, Marashlian does not preclude the trial court from 
'lJ37. Id. The court offered no legal precedent for its alternative measures of in­
jury in the absence of diminished value. They are grounded in common sense, in that 
the plaintiff cannot complain of injury where the new activity would be less onerous 
than the existing use, and less onerous than uses available as of right. 
'lJ38. 372 Mass. 157,360 N.E.2d 1051 (1977). 
289. Id. at 160-61, 360 N.E.2d at 1053-54 (quoting United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
290. Id. at 161, 360 N.E.2d at 1054 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)) (third alteration in original). 
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dismissing a matter, post-trial, for lack of standing. In this regard, 
Marashlian is quite consistent with general principles reviewed in 
Part II of this Article. The issue of standing may still be raised at 
any time during the proceedings,291 addressed sua sponte,292 or 
raised by a party for the first time at the appellate level,293 Marash­
/ian does not reduce standing to a threshold device with a useful 
lifespan limited to the pretrial phase of litigation. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision keeps intact Barvenik's 
two key contributions to the doctrine of standing: (1) rigorous proof 
of injury tailored to the stage of the litigation, and (2) injury in fact 
which is founded upon "legitimate zoning-related concerns." With 
these guardians of the court house door still in place, Marashlian 
can hardly be said to liberalize standing. The rigorous proof de­
manded by Lujan II will ,bar many plaintiffs, particularly those with 
only limited resources. The Lujan II standards are not likely to 
change, since they are pinned to the rules of civil procedure. 
Barvenik's concept of injury in fact, narrowly focused on "legiti­
mate zoning-related concerns," will also exclude plaintiffs. For ac­
cess to be significantly broadened, it is this concept which must be 
changed. 
291. See Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1484 
(10th Cir. 1995); Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th 
Cir.1993); Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. a. at 131 n.6, 597 N.E.2d at 50 n.6 and cases cited 
therein. 
292. See, e.g., National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. Carey, 557 
F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1977); Illinois Sporting Goods Ass'n v. County of Cook, 884 F. 
Supp. 275, 282 (N.D. III. 1995); Borkowski v. Fraternal Order of Police, 155 F.R.D. 105, 
111 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
293. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 412 Mass. 243, 248, 
588 N.E.2d 639,642 (1992). The court in Prudential-Bache noted that "a party may not 
argue for the first time on appeal that an opponent lacks standing to raise a constitu­
tional issue that was presented below without any objection to the party's standing." 
Id. (citing Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 244,247,516 N.E.2d 137,139 (1987), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988». This, apparently, is one of the few limitations on 
raising the issue of standing. 
